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especially true of non-international armed conflicts (“NIACs”), such as civil
wars, which are now far more common than inter-state armed conflicts. Few, if
any, scholars have asked whether obligations the Council has imposed on NIAC
parties should contribute to norms of customary international law regulating
various aspects of those conflicts. This Article is the first attempt to fill this gap.
The analysis is based on a newly compiled data set of all Council resolutions
passed on the most consequential NIACs from 1990 to 2013. The data show
that the U.N. Security Council has regularly obligated NIAC parties to act in
ways that diverge from otherwise-applicable international law in at least four
significant areas. The Article argues that patterns of obligation found in Council
resolutions on NIACs should serve as important evidence of customary international
law. Moreover, failure to account for the Council’s centrality in resolving
NIACs—substantially exceeding national interventions in scope and frequency—
would consign this critical international practice to a legal black hole.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council
(“Council”) has become the preeminent international actor in the
resolution of armed conflicts. This is especially true of noninternational armed conflicts (“NIACs”), now far more common than
inter-state armed conflicts (“IACs”).1 The Council has developed a

1. SCOTT GATES ET AL., TRENDS IN ARMED CONFLICT, 1946–2014, at 2 (2016)
(explaining how the dominant form of conflict has shifted from inter-state to internal);
Therése Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014, 52 J. PEACE RES.
536, 537 (2015) (“What stands out in the [twenty-first] century is the lack of large-scale
interstate conflict. Only one was active in 2014, the conflict between India and Pakistan,
which led to fewer than [fifty] fatalities. The remaining [thirty-nine] conflicts were fought
within states.”). The legal definition of an IAC is rooted in Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions: the rules of IACs apply to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. By contrast, a NIAC is defined in the negative: “armed conflict
not of an international character.” Id. art. 3. The question of how to classify particular
conflicts in international law is contested. See generally Dapo Akande, Classification of
Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION
OF CONFLICTS 32, 32 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (examining the distinction and
arguments on classification of conflicts as international or non-international). In
classifying conflicts included in our data set, we relied upon definitions from the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, from which we drew our overall list of conflicts. We
designated conflicts in the following two Uppsala categories as NIACs: (1) “Internal
Armed Conflict,” which “occurs between the government of a state and one or more
internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states,” and (2)
“Internationalized Internal Armed Conflict,” which “occurs between the government
of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.” See UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM,
UCDP/PRIO ARMED CONFLICT DATASET CODEBOOK 9, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/
124/c_124920-l_1-k_codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-conflict-dataset-v4_2012.pdf.
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substantial track record of quelling hostilities in NIACs, assisting in
negotiating peace agreements, supervising transitions from war to
peace, and designing new political and legal institutions for the postconflict societies.2 No single state or group of states has come close to
matching the Council’s rate of intervention.3 It is the rare NIAC that
is not subject to one or more of these Council actions.4
While the Council’s omnipresence in NIACs is now unremarkable,
the legal consequences of its actions have hardly been examined. Few
have asked whether Council actions can contribute to customary
international law, let alone whether the specific obligations the
Council imposes on NIAC parties should contribute to customary
norms regulating those conflicts.5 Traditional customary law consisted
2. See JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND CIVIL
WAR: FIRST INSIGHTS FROM A NEW DATASET 4 (2010) (“Since 1989, the Council has
deployed U.N. peace operations to twenty-four different countries affected by civil war,
imposed sanctions on dozens of civil-war parties, and established several transitional
administrations and international criminal tribunals to address civil wars and their
consequences.”); ADAM ROBERTS & DOMINIK ZAUM, SELECTIVE SECURITY: WAR AND THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1945, at 31 (2008) (discussing the impact the
Council has had on international war); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, L’Intervention du
Conseil de Sécurité dans les Conflits Internes, in LE RECOURS À LA FORCE AUTORISÉ PAR LE
CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ: DROIT ET RESPONSABILITÉ 67, 67–76 (Karine Bannelier & Cyrille
Pison eds., 2014); Peter Wallensteen & Patrick Johansson, The United Nations Security
Council in State-Based Armed Conflicts, 2003–12, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014: ARMAMENTS,
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 56, 56 (2014) (studying how the Council
uses its powers to address conflicts).
3. As demonstrated below, the Council passed at least one resolution on 76% of
all NIACs in the data set we created. By contrast, interventions by states—either
individually or in groups—occurred in only 31% of the same conflicts. See infra notes
63–68 and accompanying text.
4. Of the NIACs in our data set, only three starting after 1990 were not the subject
of Council resolutions: Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, and Algeria. See infra
notes 59–63 and accompanying text. Once the Council did address a NIAC, it passed
a median of fourteen resolutions per conflict and an average of 27.6. See infra note 122
and accompanying text.
5. The Council receives virtually no attention in leading scholarship on the
nature of customary law. See REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW vii–viii
(Brian D. Lepard ed., 2017)); CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD 278 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2016); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–83 (2014); see also NOORA ARAJÄRVI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 56–57 (2014); BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER,
DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (2010). The most recent and
comprehensive examination of customary international law is the International Law
Commission’s (ILC) Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary
International Law. Neither the sixteen draft “conclusions” produced by the
Commission in June 2016 nor the preparatory reports of the Special Rapporteur
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of acts by individual states taken out of a sense of legal obligation.6 But,
if states have repeatedly turned to the Council as their chosen agent to
address NIACs, a continued focus on state action would elide decades
of important Council practice across a wide range of conflicts. The
result could be—and arguably is—an emerging body of customary
norms that is increasingly disconnected from how the international
community actually addresses NIACs.
Many customary law questions concerning NIACs are the subject of
fierce debate, and taking account of Council actions could easily
determine their outcomes. For example, a debate on whether peace
agreements that end NIACs are legally binding has been
indeterminate, but the Council has been clear in its view that parties
must follow such agreements.7 Similarly, scholars are divided on
whether non-state rebel groups are bound by human rights
obligations, but the Council has been consistent and unequivocal in
applying human rights standards to such groups.8 Another contested
issue is whether states should hold elections in the immediate
aftermath of peace settlements in NIACs. Some scholars argue there
is no more important time to adhere to international standards of
democratic politics.9 Others argue that immediate post-conflict
elections are frequently destabilizing and may actually end up

discusses the role of the Security Council in the creation of customary norms. See
generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/71/10, at 76–79 (2016) [hereinafter ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom]; Michael
Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Identification of Customary International Law,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Wood, Third Report]. The same
is true of the International Law Association’s lengthy report published in 2000. INT’L
LAW ASS’N LONDON CONFERENCE, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (2000).
6. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J.
13, ¶ 27 (June 3) (“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of
States.”). Custom is one of the two primary sources of international law, the other
being treaties. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(c), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993.
7. See infra 14–198 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text.
9. Gregory H. Fox, International Law and the Entitlement to Democracy After War,
9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 179, 183 (2003).
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undermining democratic transitions.10 The Council has consistently
sided with the former view.11
This Article is the first attempt to take account of Council practice
in addressing these questions. Our analysis is based on a newlycompiled data set of all Council resolutions passed on the most
consequential NIACs from 1990 to 2013.12 Despite deep cleavages over
Syria, Ukraine, and a few other conflicts, the Security Council has
imposed a broad and consistent range of obligations on NIAC parties.13
The Council’s most ambitious undertakings in response to NIACs,
which are post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction missions,
have remained active and relatively uncontroversial.14 While the
weight accorded to the Council’s resolutions varies with each norm in
question, we argue that, in all cases, this practice should be considered
relevant evidence of law in the substantive areas we discuss.15 Though
many scholars have examined the Council’s so-called “legislative
resolutions”—binding, treaty-like documents obviously intended to

10. See Benjamin Reilly, Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Elections, in BUILDING
SUSTAINABLE PEACE: TIMING AND SEQUENCING OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND
PEACEBUILDING 72, 73 (Arnim Langer & Graham K. Brown eds., 2016) (examining the
consequences of holding post-conflict elections too soon after the end of a conflict,
such as nationalist or ethnic parties instead of policy-driven parties, inclusion instead
of competitiveness).
11. See infra discussion accompanying notes 232–34.
12. All data and coding documents can be found at Kristen E. Boon, Gregory H.
Fox & Isaac Jenkins, Project on the UN Security Council and Non-International Armed
Conficts, WAYNE ST. U., https://law.wayne.edu/international/securitycouncil-fox (last
visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Project Website]. As described in more detail in Part
I, we examined only resolutions on conflicts experiencing at least 1000 battle-related
deaths in at least one conflict year. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
13. Kristen E. Boon, Gregory H. Fox & Isaac Jenkins, UN Security Council Data,
WAYNE ST. U., https://law.wayne.edu/pdfs/unsc_data_for_publication_12-17-17.csv
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter UN Security Council Data Set].
14. LOUISE RIIS ANDERSEN & PETER EMIL ENGEDAL, BLUE HELMETS AND GREY ZONES:
DO UN MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS WORK? 59 (2013) (stating that U.N.-led
peace operations are less controversial to the Council than similar U.S. or NATO-led
missions).
15. “Evidence of law” refers to the definition employed by the ILC in its Draft
Conclusions on Customary International Law, which includes all materials that may be
relevant to determining the basis of identifying a custom as a source of law. ILC Draft
Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 84 n.263 (“The term ‘evidence’ is used here
as a broad concept relating to all the materials that may be considered as a basis for
the identification of customary international law, not in any technical sense as used by
particular courts or in particular legal systems.”).
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affect international law—our data is the first to assess normative
patterns across conflict-specific resolutions.16
The data also allow us to respond to the most common critique of
using Council practice as evidence of customary law: that Council
resolutions address only discrete aspects of specific conflicts and do
not establish broad, prospective rules of general application.17 The
dense patterns of obligation we identify are quite similar to the
repetitive practices of states in traditional customary law. Our data
reveal two important conclusions that support giving a prominent role
to Council practice in any legal analysis of internal conflicts: first, the
Council is heavily involved in contemporary NIACs;18 and second, the
Council has regularly imposed similar binding obligations in these
conflicts that deviate in critical respects from accepted international

16. The “legislative” or “law-making” resolutions often address issues relating to
terrorism and are treaty-like in that they set out broad, prospective rules of behavior
potentially applicable to all member states. One of the most prominent examples is
Resolution 1373, which requires all states to interrupt the financing of terrorist
operations and criminalize the willful provision of such funding. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1
(Sept. 28, 2001). Another example is Resolution 1540, which requires states to take
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 2 (Apr. 28, 2004). A third is Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist
fighters, in which the Council “decided” that all states shall “prevent and suppress the
recruiting, organizing, transporting[,] or equipping of individuals who travel to a State
other than their States of residence or nationality” for the purpose of terrorist acts.
S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 5 (Sept. 24, 2014). Unlike most Council actions, these resolutions
consciously transcend particular conflicts, including the conflict that may have
triggered Council involvement, by seeking to compel action deemed essential to
diminishing conflict in general. See José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874 (2003). In Professor Stefan Talmon’s words, these
resolutions “are phrased in neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases,
and are not usually limited in time.” Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World
Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 176 (2005). Despite the small number of these
resolutions, the literature they spawned is now vast. See, e.g., Mónica Lourdes de la
Serna Galván, Interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Threat to the Peace) by the Security
Council: Is the Security Council a Legislator for the Entire International Community?, 11
ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DRECHO INTERNACIONAL 147, 148–49 (2011) (analyzing the new
ways that the Council attempts to determine threats to peace); Nicholas Tsagourias,
Security Council Legislation, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity,
24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 539, 541 (2011) (filtering the assertion of U.N. legislative power
through the lens of subsidiarity).
17. See, e.g., ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
114 (2007) (criticizing Council for its “essentially ad hoc and unsystematic approach
to law-making[,] which results from Council action on specific issues”).
18. Our data show that the Council passed at least one resolution in 76% all NIACs
from 1990 to 2013 that we coded, increasing to 80% for NIACs that began after 1990.
See infra Section VII.A; see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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law.19 Given that the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”)
designates the Council as acting on behalf of all member states on
issues of peace and security,20 this combination of the Council’s fixture
in contemporary NIACs and its consistent imposition of similar
obligations over time make its normative preferences highly
significant.21 Council resolutions cannot be dismissed as inherently
political, negotiated compromises or as one-off responses to particular
crises when we know the Council has imposed the same obligations
across a wide variety of conflicts over time.22
We are hardly the first to identify the normative consequences of
Council practice. The Council itself is aware that its resolutions may
affect customary international law; for instance, the Council specified
in no fewer than eleven resolutions on Somali piracy that the
authorizations provided in the resolutions “shall not be considered as
establishing customary international law,” suggesting that absent such
a disclaimer, the resolutions could in fact have such an effect.23 Of
19. See infra Section VII.A.1. While important early scholarship explored the
impact of Council practice on the interpretation of the U.N. Charter, we examine
exclusively non-Charter norms.
See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2–3
(1963) (discussing the significance of the Council in the development of international
law).
20. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by
the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”).
21. An additional source of law resulting from Council resolutions, though not
from the substance of those resolutions, is the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals, which the Council created in Resolutions 808 and 955. S.C. Res.
955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 1993). Doctrine developed by the
ad hoc tribunals now permeates international criminal and humanitarian law. See
Darryl Robinson & Gillian MacNeil, The Tribunals and the Renaissance of International
Criminal Law: Three Themes, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2016) (finding that answers
provided by ad hoc tribunals to questions of international criminal law “have become
generally accepted and absorbed as the starting point for any subsequent debate”).
22. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
23. S.C. Res. 2184, ¶ 14 (Nov. 12, 2014); S.C. Res. 2182, ¶ 21 (Oct. 24, 2014);
S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 13 (Nov. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012); S.C. Res.
2020, ¶ 10 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 1950, ¶ 8 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 8
(Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 10 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 11 (Dec. 2,
2008); S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 8 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 9 (June 2, 2008); see also
Stephen Mathias, The Work of the International Law Commission on Identification of
Customary International Law: A View from the Perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs, 15
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 27 (2016) (discussing the language of Resolution 1816). The
Council also included identical language in a resolution on Libya. See S.C. Res. 2146,
¶ 9 (Mar. 19, 2014).
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equal importance, many international actors have cited Council
resolutions as evidence of customary law. These include the
International Court of Justice (ICJ),24 the International Committee of
the Red Cross,25 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY),26 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACHR),27 and the International Law Commission (ILC) in its
commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.28 But these
are citations to at most a handful of discrete resolutions. The question
is thus not whether individual Council actions can serve as evidence of
custom but how, much in the manner of consistent state practice,
patterns of Council-imposed obligations may affect customary law. We
are unaware of any prior study of aggregated Council action intended
to discover patterns of obligation.
Part I explains the methodology governing our selection and coding
of Council resolutions on NIACs. Part II details our findings from the
data, describes the general extent of Council action, and explains its
24. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 404, ¶ 81 (July 22)
(finding that a series of Council resolutions do not reveal general condemnation of
unilateral declarations of independence, which suggests that a different practice might
lead to the ICJ ascribing normative value to Council practice); see also Marko Divac
Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the
Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–80 (2005).
25. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 39 n.19, 94 n.97, 100 n.139,
107 nn.14 & 17, 109 n.24, 111 n.40, 113 nn.6–8, 137 n.60, 147 n.25, 184 n.79, 188 n.22,
195–96 nn.70–73, 198 n.87, 199 n.98, 201 nn.105–07 (2009) (noting instances where
Council resolutions contribute to customary law).
26. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Of great relevance to the formation of opinio juris . . . are
certain resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Thus, for instance,
in two resolutions on Somalia, where a civil strife was under way, the Security Council
unanimously condemned breaches of humanitarian law and stated that the authors of
such breaches or those who had ordered their commission would be held ‘individually
responsible’ for them.”).
27. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2006)
(discussing Resolutions 827 and 955, which created ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in support of norm prohibiting domestic amnesties for
crimes against humanity).
28. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 121, 175, 217, 227–28, 288–91, 334 (2001) [hereinafter ILC, Rep. 53d
Sess.] (referring to Security Council resolutions in: comment (5) of article 11;
comment (5) of article 20; comment (4) of article 30; comment (10) of article 31;
comments (7), (8), and (12) of article 41; and comment (5) of article 50).
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most common normative strategy of invoking and calling for
adherence to well-established international law. Part III describes
three areas in which Council practice may resolve debates over the
state of customary law: (1) the human rights obligations of non-state
actors in NIACs; (2) whether peace agreements ending NIACs are
legally binding; and (3) the sequencing of democratic transitions in
post-conflict states. In Part IV, we explore the potentially radical
consequence of repeated Council prohibitions on the use of force in
NIACs: a nascent jus ad bellum for internal conflicts. In Part V, we
assess the significance of this aggregated practice for customary
international law. Part VI provides conclusions and recommendations
for further research.
There are two areas where this Article does not venture. First, it does
not analyze the propriety or legality of Council actions in any depth. A
robust literature already explores potential limits on Council
jurisdiction under Chapter VII, including mechanisms such as judicial
review designed to police those limits.29 And because our data exhibit
that the Council has regularly altered law applicable to NIACs for
almost twenty-five years, it appears that if those limits do exist, they
have little impact on Council practice. Second, this Article does not
seek to measure whether the Council actions identified by the data set
successfully changed the behavior of actors addressed by its norms.
Our focus is not on the efficacy of Council practice on NIACs but
rather on understanding the new legal environment it creates.
I.

METHODOLOGY

We sought to assess whether the Security Council has responded to
NIACs by imposing a similar set of legal obligations over time.
Through this analysis we can seek to determine whether Council
practice is consistent and uniform in the manner generally required of
state practice qualifying as evidence of customary international law.30
Because there was no existing compilation of Council resolutions
related to NIACs, however, we created an original data set comprised
of all Council resolutions on armed conflicts from 1990 to 2013,

29. See, e.g., Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L.
671, 673 (exploring extra-legal measures through which to conduct oversight of the
Council, including judicial review by the ICJ or municipal courts).
30. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) (consistency); North Sea Continental
Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20) (uniformity).
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including those that were ongoing as of 1990.31 We define an “armed
conflict” as one involving at least 1000 battle-related deaths occurring
in at least one year of the conflict.32 Because we are interested in the
Council’s role in promulgating binding legal obligations, for our
hypothesis, a clear distinction exists between binding and non-binding
Council statements.33 In coding the resolutions, we therefore

31. We take 1990 to be an important transition point in world history, which ended
U.S. and Soviet proxy wars in developing countries and ushered in a new focus on
human rights in the international community. Relevant scholarship has shown that
the Council became more willing to address conflicts with assertive resolutions as the
sweeping effects of the end of the Cold War triggered civil wars around the world. See
Lisa Hultman, UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm
Implementation?, 50 J. PEACE RES. 59, 60 (2013); Peter Viggo Jakobsen, National Interest,
Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?, 33 J.
PEACE RES. 205, 205 (1996) (observing that the U.N. shift toward peace enforcement
after the Cold War was considered a very controversial change in U.N. behavior).
32. See Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946–2009, 47 J. PEACE
RES. 501, 501 (2010). While the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold is not
uncontested in the literature, we selected this threshold because these severe conflicts
are most likely to merit inclusion in the Council’s limited agenda time. For an
argument for a lower threshold, see Nicholas Sambanis, What Is Civil War?: Conceptual
and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 814, 818–19
(2004), which argues for a threshold of twenty-five deaths. Our definitional threshold
reflects two additional choices. First, there is the question of whether the threshold
number, whatever it is, should count battlefield deaths or battle-related deaths.
Maryann Cusimano Love, God and Global Governance: Resurgent Religion in World Politics,
in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA 170, 178 (Maryann Cusimano
Love ed., 4th ed. 2011). Because the Security Council has evinced a particular concern
over conflicts with high civilian casualty rates, we have chosen to use battle-related
deaths in order to take those concerns into account. Second, some conflict data sets
include those with 1000 deaths in at least one conflict year while others include those
with 1000 deaths over the lifetime of the conflict. See Charles H. Anderton & John R.
Carter, Conflict Datasets: A Primer for Academics, Policymakers, and Practitioners, 22 DEF. &
PEACE ECON. 21, 35 (2011). We have chosen the former because it correlates with the
Security Council’s tendency to focus only on the most destructive conflicts. See
VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?: SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICES
AFTER CIVIL WAR 19 (2008) (discussing how the Council decides where to send
peacekeepers); Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to
Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q.
819, 819 (2006) (arguing that mediations correlate to the success of an agreement);
Michael J. Gilligan & Ernest J. Sergenti, Do UN Interventions Cause Peace?: Using
Matching to Improve Causal Inference, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 89, 89 (2005) (analyzing the
effectiveness of U.N. interventions during and after civil war); Mark J. Mullenbach,
Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of ThirdParty Peacekeeping Missions, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 529, 529 (2005) (examining how third
party actors decide to partake in peacekeeping missions).
33. We recognize that in some circumstances binding obligations may be
contained in preambular paragraphs to resolutions and in Presidential Statements
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established a three-point scale: (1) clearly non-binding statements;
(2) statements that may be binding; and (3) statements that are clearly
binding.34 Whenever possible, we note the percentage of resolutions
with Chapter VII obligations, the clearest form of binding Council
obligation, and thus coded as Category 3.35 In order to take account
of uncertainty in distinguishing binding from non-binding obligations,
when we describe the percentage of NIACs in which the Council
imposes a particular obligation, that figure includes all binding or
potentially binding obligations.36
The question of how to distinguish binding from non-binding
Council obligations is not easily answered. For coding purposes, we
employed several clear markers to help identify binding obligations:
citations to Articles 25 or 48 of the U.N. Charter, a Chapter VII
authorization, or use of verbs at the outset of operative paragraphs
widely recognized by experts as signaling binding obligations.37
Although the ICJ has given general guidance on how Security Council
resolutions are to be interpreted, considerable disagreement persists
with regard to whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and other approaches to interpretation are applicable to Council

issued by the Council. Because these are rare, however, they are not statistically
significant, and our study encompasses only the body of Security Council resolutions.
34. See infra Appendix I. In the Israeli Wall case, the ICJ held that Israel had
“contravened” a number of Security Council resolutions not passed under Chapter VII.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 134 (July 9); see also Öberg, supra note 24, at 885
n.40 (“Only obligations, of course, can be contravened.”).
35. See infra Appendix I; see also LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 389 (4th ed. 2014) (“[W]hen Council members have
wanted to signal that a resolution is to be understood as being mandatory, the Council
has almost always either specifically cited Chapter VII or included wording which clearly
implies reliance on that chapter.” (emphasis added)). Judge Koroma appears to have
adopted this view in his dissenting opinion in the Kosovo case. Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo,
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 10 (July 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting) (stating that
resolution 1244, a resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, is binding).
36. Importantly, using this metric allows us to address the critique that some verbs
on our list may not always signal binding obligations, or that in some cases it may be
impossible to determine the Council’s intentions. Such uncertainty would not exist if
an obligation was imposed under Chapter VII, if the obligation was denominated as a
“decision,” or if the Council invoked Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter.
37. We used the following verbs to signal binding obligations (category one in our
coding): Decides, Authorizes, Demands, Determines, Resolves, Condemns, and
Endorses (if followed by a threat). See infra Appendix I.
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resolutions.38 Similarly, states, including the Council’s five permanent
members (“P5”), disagree on which verbs signal binding obligations in
resolutions. Apart from the term “decisions,” no authoritative source
draws clear categorical distinctions between binding and non-binding
language.39 Moreover, states have now made public their views on
which verbs signal binding obligations in Council resolutions, with
surprising results: some P5 states view only the verb “decides” as
signaling a binding obligation, while others declare they are more
flexible, noting that a reference to Chapter VII would be sufficient.40
Nonetheless, this uncertainty does not mean that the most restrictive
views of Council language should cast doubt on the utility of our longer
list of “binding” verbs.41 International actors citing the Council for
evidence of custom have invoked resolutions with a broad range of
verbs, suggesting that the most restrictive views of Council member
states are not shared by other international actors.42 The ICJ has cited
resolutions that use “calls upon,” “deplores,” and “strongly reaffirms.”43

38. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21) (articulating that the
language of a Security Council resolution must be carefully analyzed when evaluating
its binding effect and that determining whether the powers under Article 25 have been
exercised requires “regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council”);
Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, Revisited, in 20 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. ONLINE 1, 2 (2017); Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation
of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 73, 74 (1998)
(offering views on Council resolutions based on practical experience); Michael Wood,
The Law of Treaties and UN Security Council Resolutions: Some Reflections, in THE LAW OF
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 244, 255 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011)
(outlining the Council’s impact on the law of treaties).
39. South West Africa, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 113 (obliging states to adhere to “the decisions
of the Security Council” made with reference to the U.N. Charter). Article 25 of the
U.N. Charter requires member states to carry out “decisions” of the Council.
U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
40. The differences of views among member states became clear during the authors’
discussions with legal advisors to several national missions to the United Nations.
41. Infra Appendix I.
42. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
43. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 81 (July 22) (citing
S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 3 (Nov. 16, 1992) (using “strongly reaffirms”); S.C. Res. 541, ¶ 1 (Nov. 18,
1983) (using “deplores”); S.C. Res. 217, ¶¶ 4–10 (Nov. 20, 1965) (using “calls upon”)).
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The ICTY has invoked resolutions with “condemns” and “demands.”44
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has cited resolutions using
“demands,” “condemns,” “express its concern,” and “emphasizes.”45
The IACHR has relied on “calls upon,” preambular paragraphs, and
resolutions as a whole without citing to particular paragraphs.46 And
the ILC in commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
cites resolutions using “reaffirms,” “calls upon,” “requests,” “urges,”
and “deplores.”47 Together, these verbs comprise a broader set of
binding terms than the data set employed.48 Absent an authoritative
list, our category of binding indicators is more consistent and perhaps
more rigorous than current international practice.
In order to understand whether Council practice provides evidence
of changing norms in international law, it is necessary to examine how
the Council intervenes in conflicts. We perform a descriptive analysis
of the data, focusing on key variables of interest, to understand how,
where, and when the Council has made binding decisions.49 We do
not impose parametric assumptions or provide theoretical predictors
as covariates.50 Instead, we use the three-point scale for each variable
44. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (citing S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 5 (Dec. 3, 1992) (using “condemns”);
S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 8 (Mar. 26, 1993) (using “demands”)).
45. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 216 (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/SCSL-04-15-T-1234searchable.pdf (citing S.C. Res. 1828 using “demands,” S.C. Res. 1633 using
“condemns,” S.C. Res. 78, using “emphasizes,” and S.C. Res. 954 using “emphasizes”);
Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), ¶¶ 28–29 (May 31, 2004)
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/131/SCSL-04-14AR72(E)-131.pdf (citing S.C. Res. 1071 using “condemns”).
46. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 39 (1999) (citing S.C. Res. 237 using “calls upon”).
47. ILC, Rep. 53d Sess., supra note 28, at 287 (citing S.C. Res. 687 using
“reaffirms”); id. at 288 (citing S.C. Res. 662 using “calls upon”); id. at 291 (citing S.C.
Res. 218 using “requests”); id. (citing S.C. Res. 569 using “urges”); id. at 334 (citing
S.C. Res. 171 using “deplores”); id. (citing S.C. Res. 332 using “calls upon”).
48. For a list of binding terms employed by the data set, see infra Appendix I.
49. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
50. Predicting even when the Council passes resolutions, let alone when it imposes
individual obligations, requires a multi-stage theory of the Council process. We do not
attempt to provide such a theory, which would have to account for target conflict
dynamics, the political influence of the Council membership, and the deterministic
influence of the P5. For more on these dynamics, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita &
Alastair Smith, The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership, 54 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 667, 668 (2010), which presents information to support the claim
that there are few ways to predict which nations are elected to the Council, and Barry

2018]

NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

663

of interest to calculate relative frequencies of binding decisions in each
category and for each conflict.51 Generating the relative frequencies
involves taking a simple proportion of observations that meet a
designated threshold over a relevant number of observations drawn
from the population.
II.

GENERAL FINDINGS

This Part first provides a general description of the findings and then
analyzes four specific areas where Council-imposed obligations should
be considered as providing evidence of customary law: (1) human
rights obligations of non-state actors in NIACs; (2) the status of peace
agreements following NIACs; (3) elections in post-NIAC states; and
(4) a nascent jus ad bellum for NIACs.
A.

Overview

Our analysis of 1057 resolutions between 1990 and 2013,
representing 56 NIACs, shows that the Council is widely involved in
NIACs and, moreover, that there are patterns to the Council’s
application of obligations.52 The data show that the Council passed
resolutions for the majority of NIACs (76%),53 and confirms that it
became slightly more involved in conflicts that began after 1990
(80%),54 though it remained very active for both new and legacy
conflicts.55 The range in the number of resolutions passed on
individual NIACs is large, from zero resolutions to ninety-seven.56
When the Council chooses to pass a resolution, it does not involve itself
lightly; for conflicts contained within our period of study, the average
duration was 9.8 years, with a median of fourteen resolutions per
conflict and an average of 27.6.57 Geographically, the Council has been

O’Neill, Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council, 40 J. CONFLICT RES.
219, 219 (1996), which discusses the power associated with voting ability on the Council.
51. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
52. A more detailed description of our coding methodology and additional
descriptive statistics are contained in Appendix II, available at https://law.wayne.edu/
pdfs/fox_boon_jenkins_appendix_ii_1-17-18.pdf.
53. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The Council did not pass resolutions during this time period on NIACs in
Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, or Turkey.
57. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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most heavily involved relative to the number of conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia and in Africa.58
The Council has invoked Chapter VII authorities in 48% of
conflicts59 and usage of Chapter VII corresponds to the conflicts with
the highest number of resolutions (such as Bosnia),60 confirming that
the Council becomes most heavily involved in cases in which not all
parties to conflict are cooperative. The top conflict list indicates that
the Council became most intensely involved in a diverse set of conflicts,
including some in the former Soviet sphere in the early 1990s and
some of the most violent African NIACs.61 The top conflicts in terms
of resolutions per year also include a diverse set: some are among the
shortest conflicts—Croatia/Yugoslavia, Iraq/Kuwait62—while others
among the longest—Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DR Congo”).63
The Council pursued an array of remedies in response to NIACs. It
created twenty-six peacekeeping missions for the conflicts we coded,64
leading to involvement by peacekeepers in 57% of all these NIACs.65
During the same period, the Council created a total of fifty-three
missions—or 76% of all missions ever—to be involved in conflicts, postconflict situations, and states with border disputes, though not all such
conflicts met the threshold for inclusion in the data.66 As expected,
this represents a substantial increase in involvement after the Cold
War.67 Further, the Council gave missions Chapter VII mandates in
48% of conflicts and applied sanctions in a further 35%, which
58. See Andrew S. Cottey, United Nations, in 1 MODERN GENOCIDE: THE DEFINITIVE
RESOURCE AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 381, 381 (Paul R. Bartrop & Steven Leonard
Jacobs eds., 2015) (reflecting on the ways in which the United Nations was heavily
engaged in the Yugoslav conflict, specifically to discuss international actions in the
conflict and manage international operations); Gift Phiri, African Nations Push for
Permanent UNSC Seat, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2013/09/african-nations-push-for-permanent-unsc-seat2013924133231925482.html (emphasizing African calls for an permanent African seat
on the Council since the Council’s recent agenda has been heavily Afrocentric).
59. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
60. Id.
61. A list of conflicts coded with a corresponding number of resolutions is available
at Project Website, supra note 12.
62. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., Introduction, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 5–8 (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al. eds., 2016) (acknowledging the
increase of Council actions after the end of the Cold War due, in part, to the
cooperation of the permanent Council members).
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represents 73% of instances where it invoked Chapter VII.68 Thus, the
Council has robustly applied its most aggressive tools to arrest active
conflicts during this period.
B.

Enforcement of Existing Norms or Confirmation of Evolved Practice

A clear pattern emerging from the data is that the Council
frequently reaffirms existing norms. In the areas of human rights,
international humanitarian law (IHL), and individual criminal
responsibility in particular, the data show that the Council’s normative
practice reaffirms existing and agreed-upon practices.69 In other
words, an important role of the Council is to act as an institutional
enforcer for settled norms and practices in the context of NIACs.70
Table 1: Council Reaffirmation of Existing International Law Norms
For NIACs in which Ch VII was invoked, the Council:
77%

Requested All Parties Comply with IHL
Called for Perpetrators to be
Held Accountable

73%

Required Parties to Respect
Human Rights

69%

Condemned Violations of
Human Rights
Condemned Violations
of IHL

64%

50%

68. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
69. See infra Table 1.
70. Kristen E. Boon, UN Sanctions as Regulation, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 543, 560–
61 (2016) (explaining the Council’s role as an institutional enforcer to act against and
target non-state actors).
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With regard to human rights, in 69% of NIACs that started before
1990 and included at least one Chapter VII resolution, the Council
required parties to respect human rights obligations.71 This number
decreased by 10% of similar conflicts that commenced after 1990.72
Nonetheless, references to human rights violations increased from
63% to 67% in the same period.73 In Darfur and Somalia, for example,
the Council consistently condemned human rights violations by
government actors.74
All of these resolutions use as their point of departure existing
human rights obligations in major multilateral treaties. A similar
pattern is apparent with regard to IHL.75 In 75% of NIACs with at least
one Chapter VII resolution, the Council made a general request to
comply with IHL obligations, increasing to 83% in post-1990
conflicts.76 The same is true for individual criminal responsibility. In
50% of NIACS, the Council condemned violations of international
criminal law.77 And in 69% of pre-1990 Chapter VII conflicts, rising to
83% of post-1990 conflicts, the Council called for perpetrators to be held
responsible or to be brought to justice.78 There are also numerous
71. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (recording that the Council both
“[s]trongly condemn[ed] the widespread violations of human rights and [IHL] by the
Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of [IHL] by armed
groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence”).
74. See S.C. Res. 2158, ¶¶ 12–14 (May 29, 2014) (condemning grave violations
against children and calling on the federal government in Somalia to actively promote
respect for and protect human rights); S.C. Res. 2003, ¶ 16 (July 29, 2011)
(condemning “human rights violations in, and relating to, Darfur, including arbitrary
arrests and detentions,” by expressing “deep concern about the situation of all those
so detained, including civil society members and IDPs” . . . and calling “on the
Government of Sudan fully to respect its obligations, including by fulfilling its
commitment to lift the state of emergency in Darfur, releasing all political prisoners,
allowing free expression[,] and undertaking effective efforts to ensure accountability
for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”).
75. Related is the issue of refugees and their rights. The Council has been prolific
on the need to adhere to the Refugee Convention and Protocol. See CHRISTIANE
AHLBORN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION THROUGH THE
PRACTICE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 36–37 (2011) (highlighting the need for
parties to armed conflicts to fully abide by international law, specifically laws and
provisions relating to women and children).
76. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2093, ¶¶ 1, 12 (Mar. 6, 2013); S.C. Res. 1019 ¶¶ 3, 9 (Nov. 9,
1995); S.C. Res. 820, ¶¶ 7–8 (Apr. 17, 1993); S.C. Res. 771, ¶ 1 (Aug. 13, 1992).
77. Resolutions on Bosnia Herzegovina are illustrative. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1882, ¶ 1
(Aug. 4, 2009); S.C. Res. 1502, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2003); S.C. Res. 1034, ¶¶ 1, 2 (Dec. 21,
1995); S.C. Res. 819, ¶¶ 6, 7 (Apr. 16, 1993).
78. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1355 ¶ 15 (June 15, 2001); S.C. Res. 1231, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 1999).
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instances in which the Council ordered states to cooperate with
international criminal tribunals.79 In these subject matter areas, Security
Council resolutions do not change the law so much as enforce it.
III.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATES OVER EXISTING LAW

Our second and more significant finding is that Council practice is
relevant to unresolved debates over customary norms and to the
emergence of new norms related to NIACs. The four substantive issues
we discuss represent a spectrum of norm crystallization.80 In the first
two, involving non-state actors, the Council has contributed to longstanding legal debates. In the third, involving post-conflict elections,
the Council has affirmed controversial norms of democratic governance
in circumstances where many argue the norms may be counterproductive. In the fourth, the Council has suggested a radical
departure from existing law by outlining a nascent jus ad bellum for
NIACs. The varying nature of these debates suggests that the addition
of Council practice will have different consequences for different
norms. In close cases, such as those involving non-state actors, Council
practice may well come close to resolving the debates. In those situations
where well-established doctrines would need to be revisited—like a jus ad
bellum for NIACs—Council views may simply serve to widen debates
about major shifts in custom still in their early stages.

79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 5 (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1649, ¶ 19 (Dec. 21, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 14 (June 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4 (May 25, 1993).
80. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Council-Imposed Obligations in Three Areas
of Disputed Customary International Law
Obligations on Non-State Actors
92%

Ordered Non-State Actors to Abide by Peace Agreements

82%

Peacekeepers to Protect Human Rights

73%

Called for Perpetrators to be Held Accountable

Perpetrators
Required Called
Non-Statefor
Actors
to Respect
Human Rights
Accountable

to be Held
69%

Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Peacekeepers to Assist in Transformation
of Institutions
Peacekeepers to Establish Rule of Law

65%

Peacekeepers to Foster Democratic
Institutions
Peacekeepers to Support Free and
Fair Elections

71%

63%
53%

Just ad Bellum for NIACs
82%

All Parties to Cease Hostilities
Sanctions Imposed for Failure to Cease Hostilities

A.

73%

Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors

A non-state actor is by definition a party to every NIAC.81 The
traditional gap between robust regulation of IACs and the relatively
minimal regulation of NIACs is largely attributable to states’ desire for
maximum discretion in confronting non-state groups as well as a desire
to avoid legitimizing the groups through their acquisition of legal rights

81. See Non-international Armed Conflict, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/non-international-armed-conflict (last visited Feb.
7, 2018) (defining NIACs as “armed conflicts in which one or more non-State armed
groups are involved”).
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and obligations.82 The traditional and still dominant view is that “most
non-state actors, even the most influential of them are neither proper
law-makers nor subjects of international law.”83 But this statist paradigm
has been forcefully challenged by functionalist arguments that assert a
need to recognize greater legal parity among parties to NIACS where
rebels control substantial territory and in other ways act like states.84
1.

State of the law
Human rights principles famously helped break the state’s nearmonopoly on legal capacity to acquire rights under international law.85
But human rights instruments have not expanded obligations beyond
the state, and the traditional view has been that rebel groups lack the

82. See generally P.H. Kooijmans, The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties
to Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 333, 333 (Karl Wellens
ed., 1998) (discussing the legal implications of Council resolutions that focus on nonstate entities); Anja Mihr, Non-State Actors in Conflict, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT
305, 310 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2012) (distinguishing between different types of
non-state actors by highlighting that some use their position to reach alternative
goals); Dan Miodownik & Oren Barak, Introduction, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 1 (Dan Miodownik & Oren Barak eds., 2014) (discussing the
role of external non-state actors in intrastate conflict); Anton O. Petrov, Non-State Actors
and the Law of Armed Conflict Revisited: Enforcing International Law Through Domestic
Engagement, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 279, 279 (2014) (explaining the drawbacks
of giving non-state actors international law-making powers and offering a similar, or
better, alternative); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate
Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE
J. INT’L L. 107, 108 (2012) (arguing that non-state actors play a limited role in making
international law).
83. Jean d’Aspremont, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism: The
Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 23, 25 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011) [hereinafter PARTICIPANTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM].
84. See William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State
Actors, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207, 229–40, nn.78–131 (2015) (referring to many sources
that argue for and against giving non-state actors more authority and power); see also
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligation for Non-State Actors: Where Are We Now?, in
DOING PEACE THE RIGHTS WAY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN
HONOUR OF LOUISE ARBOUR (Fannie Lafontaine & François Larocqu, eds.,
forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2641390 (arguing that non-state actors already have obligations in the
realm of international human rights).
85. Gregory Fox, Navigating the Unilateral/Multilateral Divide, in JUS POST BELLUM:
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 229, 237 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday
& Jens Iverson, eds. 2014).

670

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:649

legal personality to acquire such obligations under treaty86 or customary
law.87 Many scholars have rejected this view as rigidly formalist and
oblivious to the reality of human rights violations in NIACs.88 They point
out that U.N. human rights bodies now routinely investigate and criticize
rebel groups.89 Moreover, scholars argue that when such groups and
86. Virtually all human rights treaties are limited to ratification by states. See, e.g.,
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 63, ¶ 1, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217 (“The present Charter shall be open to signature, ratification[,] or
adherence of the Member States of the Organisation of African Unity.”); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 48, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(“The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United
Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the present
Covenant.”). The one exception appears to be the Optional Protocol to the Rights of
the Child Convention, which provides in Article 4(1): “Armed groups that are distinct
from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use
in hostilities persons under the age of [eighteen] years.” Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict art. 4, ¶ 1, Feb. 12, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 13,094, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222. But Cedric
Ryngaert points out that the Protocol has attributes of international humanitarian law,
which undoubtedly applies to armed groups in certain circumstances, in addition to
highlighting the use of “should” in Article 4(1) rather than “shall” indicates the article
is “suggestive rather than binding.” Cedric Ryngaert, Human Rights Obligations of Armed
Groups, 41 BELGIAN REV. INT’L L. 355, 364 (2008).
87. CEDRIC RYNGAERT & JEAN D’ASPREMONT, INT’L LAW ASS’N, NON STATE ACTORS 10
(2014) [hereinafter NON STATE ACTORS] (reporting that direct responsibility of armed
opposition groups “remains hypothetical in the present state of international law”);
Ryngaert, supra note 86, at 362 (stating that human rights supervisory bodies have never
given non-state actors human rights responsibilities as a matter of law); see also Robert
McCorquodale, Overlegalizing Silences: Human Rights and Nonstate Actors, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 384, 384 (2002) (“The international human rights law system is a state-based
system, a system in which the law operates in only one area: state action. It ignores
actions by nonstate actors . . . . Nonstate actors are treated as if their actions could not
violate human rights, or it is pretended that states can and do control all their activities.”).
88. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6 n.20 (referencing scholars who argue
non-state actors can be bound to comply with international humanitarian law). Some
cite Security Council resolutions in support of this claim. See, e.g., Dapo Akande &
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief
Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 483, 487 n.15 (2016) (discussing Council
resolutions to argue that “[i]n recent years there has been a shift towards imputing
obligations to comply with human rights on non-State armed groups in situations
where they exercise effective control over territory and populations and discharge a
degree of public and administrative functions”).
89. There is disagreement about whether the recommendations issued by these
bodies address states or the groups themselves. Compare Clapham, supra note 84, at 6
(discussing how “nearly all speeches and statements at the [United Nations] refer to
human rights violations being committed by armed groups,” sometimes clearly
condemning human rights violations committed by those groups), with Jean-Marie
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not the government control significant portions of national territory,
holding the groups accountable is the only means of securing the
rights of local inhabitants.90 Many states respond that holding rebel
groups accountable would implicitly acknowledge their capacity to
govern, which in turn would accord them an unwarranted legitimacy.91
The uncertainty surrounding this debate is amplified by
disagreements among proponents over the precise content of rebel
groups’ human rights obligations.92 Views range from the full
complement of rights set out in the Universal Declaration,93 to a short
list of peremptory norms,94 to a more flexible approach that would
apply human rights “to the extent appropriate to the context.”95
2.

Security Council practice
The Council ordered non-state actors to respect human rights in
35% of all NIACs in the data set.96 It imposed those obligations in 68%
of NIACs in which it had invoked Chapter VII and in 83% of such
conflicts that commenced after 1990.97 Relatedly, the Council called
for state and non-state perpetrators of human rights violations to be
held accountable in 73% of NIACs in which it had invoked Chapter
VII.98 And in 82% of NIACs in which it invoked Chapter VII, the

Henckaerts & Cornelius Wiesener, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups:
A Possible Contribution from Customary International Law?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 146, 148 (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds.,
2013) (stating that monitoring bodies have not addressed the responsibility of armed
groups themselves).
90. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6.
91. Id. at 7.
92. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 511 (2006) [hereinafter Clapham, Human
Rights Obligations] (examining demands by international organizations for rebels to
comply with human rights obligations outside the boundaries of humanitarian law).
93. Id. at 505–06 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur Philip Alston as saying that
non-state actors must still comply with the requirements of the international
community as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
94. See id. at 506 (listing rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly,
expression, family life, and democratic participation as human rights norms that nonstate actors must still respect).
95. Id. at 502 (arguing that the basis for human rights obligations that non-state
actors must respect should simply be the extent to which resources are available within
the economic and social situation of the conflict).
96. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Council mandated a peacekeeping mission to protect human rights,
regardless of the identity of the violator.99
The Council has called on rebel groups by name to cease activities
that violate human rights, including the right to security of the
person.100 In the DR Congo, for example, it condemned
sexual violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare and
atrocities perpetrated in the Ituri area by the Mouvement de
Libération du Congo (MLC) and the Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie/National (RCD/N) troops, as well as the acts of
violence recently perpetrated by the Union des Patriotes Congolais
(UPC) forces.101

More frequently, the Council has demanded that “all parties” or “all
factions and forces” or “armed groups” cease such acts.102 An example
is the conflict in Mali, where, in early 2012, Taureg rebels along with
Ansar Dine and other Islamist groups took control of much of the
northern part of the country.103 After issuing a Presidential Statement
condemning acts by the rebels,104 the Council invoked Chapter VII and
called on “all parties in the North of Mali to cease all abuses of human
rights and violations of international humanitarian law.”105 It repeated
the same demand three months later, again invoking Chapter VII.106
While a transitional government soon took control in Mali and a
French-led intervention reversed rebel gains, in December the Council
remained concerned that the “entrenchment of terrorist groups and
criminal networks in the north of Mali continue[d] to pose a serious

99. Id.
100. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2127, ¶ 17 (Dec. 5, 2013) (condemning acts of violence and
violations of international humanitarian law by non-state actors in Central African
Republic); S.C. Res. 2067, ¶ 18 (Sept. 18, 2012) (condemning violent actions and
attacks by terrorist groups and their affiliates in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1663, ¶ 7 (Mar. 24,
2006) (condemning armed attacks against civilians in Sudan).
101. S.C. Res. 1468, ¶ 2 (Mar. 20, 2003).
102. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (Syria); S.C. Res. 2046, ¶ 7 (May 2,
2012) (South Sudan); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (Sudan/Darfur); S.C. Res.
1814, ¶ 16 (May 15, 2008) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 1341, ¶ 9 (Feb. 22, 2001) (DR Congo);
S.C. Res. 1181, ¶ 12 (July 13, 1998) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 876, ¶ 4 (Oct. 19, 1993)
(Georgia/Abkhazia).
103. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Government of Mali, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET,
http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=72&entityType=0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
104. S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/9 (Apr. 4, 2012).
105. S.C. Res. 2056, ¶ 13 (July 5, 2012).
106. S.C. Res. 2071, ¶ 5 (Oct. 12, 2012) (demanding that “all groups in the north
of Mali cease all abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian
law, including targeted attacks against the civilian population, sexual violence,
recruitments of child soldiers and forced displacements”).
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and urgent threat to the population throughout Mali.”107 Again
invoking Chapter VII, it authorized an African-led peacekeeping
mission, which was tasked in part to “support the Malian authorities in
recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of
terrorist, extremist[,] and armed groups and in reducing the threat
posed by terrorist organizations.”108
When rebel groups fail to heed Council directives they are
increasingly targeted with sanctions.109 Only four of the sixteen
Council sanctions regimes in place in 2017 targeted state actors
exclusively; the rest targeted non-state actors exclusively or both state
and non-state actors.110
3.

Conclusions
The Security Council has consistently supported application of
human rights obligations to non-state parties in NIACs. It has done so
by condemning such groups by name and by including them in
demands that all parties cease human rights abuses and respect human
rights.111 Moreover, the Council has empowered peacekeeping
missions to secure rights against violation by non-state groups.112 The
Council has thus weighed in on the anti-statist side of a debate when

107. S.C. Res. 2085, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2012).
108. Id. ¶ 9(b). In a November report outlining a proposed United Nations
presence in Mali, the Secretary-General recommended that “a strong United Nations
human rights component should be envisaged as part of a multidimensional United
Nations presence to monitor, report publicly and respond to violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties.” U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc.
S/2012/894 (Nov. 28, 2012) (emphasis added).
109. See Nigel D. White, Sanctions Against Non-State Actors, in COERCIVE DIPLOMACY,
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 148–49 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 2016)
(examining the Council’s actions in progressively increasing sanctions in cases of noncompliance in the context of the National Union for the Tital Independence of Angola
(UNITA) rebel group in Angola).
110. The Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions
(SPITS), SPITS Sanctions List 2017, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://pcr.uu.se/
digitalAssets/165/c_165534-l_1-k_spits-sanctions-list-2017.pdf (listing all current and
terminated sanctions with four “government only” targets—Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau,
Iran, North Korea—and either “non-state actors” or a combination of the two as the
remaining targets).
111. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2216, at 2, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2015) (condemning the military
escalation by the Houthis and calling on all parties to respect human rights
obligations).
112. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1925, ¶ 12 (May 28, 2010) (allowing the peacekeeping
mission in DR Congo to use the force necessary to protect civilians from violence
initiated by any party in the conflict).
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confronted with the question of whether the traditional human rights
regime applies beyond state actors. The value of Council practice as
evidence for customary law is enhanced by the breadth of its
condemnations, which run from “human rights” abuses generally113 to
specific obligations, such as those regarding child soldiers114 and sexual
violence.115 Using Council practice as evidence of customary law is also
enhanced by its efforts to achieve compliance through sanctions
regimes and the dispatch of peacekeeping missions.
B.

Status of Peace Agreements Ending NIACs

NIACs increasingly terminate through peace agreements, which are
often detailed documents covering not only the end of hostilities but
also a complex set of steps designed to achieve reconciliation and
return the post-conflict state to its full functioning status.116 Are these
agreements legally binding?
This question is of interest to
international lawyers for two principal reasons. First, binding
agreements may more successfully accomplish their objectives than
non-binding agreements. In the realm of inter-state agreements,
evidence suggests that the reputational capital that states invest in
binding as opposed to non-binding instruments may lead to greater
levels of compliance.117 The same may be true of NIAC parties.
113. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2014, ¶ 2 (Oct. 21, 2011) (condemning both human rights
violations and human rights abuses by the Yemeni government and other actors).
114. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1493, ¶ 13 (July 28, 2003) (condemning the use of child
soldiers in the hostilities in the DR Congo).
115. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2017) (condemning sexual and gender-based
violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)).
116. See CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX
PACIFICATORIA 28 (2008) (discussing the rise of peace agreements as a method to end
civil conflicts following the end of the Cold War); Joakim Kreutz, How Civil Wars End
(and Recur), in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CIVIL WARS 349, 356 (Edward Newman & Karl
DeRouen, Jr. eds., 2014) (exploring the impact on the duration of a civil war when it
is ended with a peace agreement); see also Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Peace
Agreements or ‘Pieces of Paper’? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and
Their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 941, 943–44 (2010) (describing the Security
Council’s inclusion of roles for women in its efforts to end armed conflicts through
peace agreements); Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 82, at 144–46 (describing the
substance of recently implemented peace agreements).
117. For a variety of perspectives on signaling, reputation, and expectations, see
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 427–28 (2010), which examines the difference between attempting
to enforce binding agreements on one hand and utilizing norms and reputational
pressures on the other to support compliance in post-conflict settlements with nonstate actors; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG.
175, 176, 193 (1993), which explains how the international community seeks to raise
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Second, some NIAC peace agreements contain full or partial
amnesties, the enforcement of which may turn on whether the
agreement as a whole is legally binding.118 The question of whether
NIAC peace agreements are binding under international law is thus an
important one.
1.

State of the law
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (VCLT) iconic
definition of a treaty is limited to agreements between states.119
However, a savings clause in VCLT Article 3 provides that the
definition does not affect the legal status of agreements “between
States and other subjects of international law.”120 The question for
peace agreements ending NIACs, then, is whether the non-state rebel
parties may be considered “subjects of international law.”121
Three major views are evident in international practice and
scholarship.122 The first, exemplified by the decision of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in the case of Prosecutor v. Kallon,123 asserts that
rebel groups lack the requisite legal personality to enter into binding
agreements.124 The second argues that peace agreements may be
compliance levels by using reputational pressures; and Beth A. Simmons, International
Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,
94 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 819, 819–20 (2000), which links post-conflict settlements to
financial incentives in order to support compliance.
118. Francesca Lessa et al., Persistent or Eroding Impunity? The Divergent Effects of Legal
Challenges to Amnesty Laws for Past Human Rights Violations, 47 ISR. L. REV. 105, 112, 130–31
(2014) (indexing 161 domestic and international judicial challenges to sixty-three different
amnesties where only some of the challenged amnesties originated in peace agreements).
119. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(a), art. 46, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
120. Id. art. 3.
121. Id.; see Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, supra note 92, at 492.
122. Discussion of this issue can often become circular. See Jan K. Kleffner, Peace
Treaties, in 8 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 110
(Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2012) (“It is commonly held that an international legal person
is an entity that possesses rights and obligations under international law, while the
determination of whether such rights and obligations exist draws on whether the
addressee of those rights and obligations possesses international legal personality.”
(citation omitted)).
123. Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé
Accord Amnesty (Mar. 13, 2004), http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/
2004.03.13_Prosecutor_v_Kallon_Norman_Kamara.pdf.
124. Id. ¶ 1. This case concerned the Lomé Agreement of July 7, 1999, which ended
the civil war between the government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone (RUF). See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-RUF, art. I, July 7, 1999,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceA
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binding under certain circumstances.125 These circumstances include
the scope and duration of a NIAC126 and the intent of the state and
international organization subject to the agreement.127 The third view
is that efforts to fit NIAC agreements into existing legal categories face
fundamental limitations.128
2.

Security Council practice
Council practice on this fraught question has been consistent and
clear: non-state parties are obligated to comply with NIAC peace
agreements they have signed.129 The negotiation and implementation
of most such agreements now involves the Council ex ante, ex post, or
both.130 Fifty percent (23/46) of the NIACs in our data set have peace

greement.pdf [hereinafter Lomé Peace Agreement].
The Lomé Agreement
contained a broad amnesty provision that the defendants argued precluded the Court
from exercising jurisdiction. Id. art. IX. The prosecution responded that the Lomé
Agreement was not a “treaty,” and thus, the amnesty provision could not be opposed
against Sierra Leone. Kallon, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), ¶¶ 2, 32. The Appeals Chamber
sided with the prosecution, conceding that while the RUF might possess the legal
capacity for purposes of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
“[i]nternational law does not seem to have vested them with such [treaty-making]
capacity.” Id. ¶ 48. While the Court did not discuss the VCLT definition, and its
reasoning on the treaty issue is frustratingly elliptical, it appeared to fix on the RUF’s
inability to function as a state as a decisive factor. Id. ¶ 41.
125. See Antonio Cassesse, The Special Court and International Law: The Decision
Concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1130, 1134 (2004).
126. Id. (explaining the ways in which non-state actors can obtain standing to enter
into agreements through objective demonstrations of legitimacy such as long term
control over territories).
127. Id. at 1135 (determining the binding quality of the agreements by examining
the intent of the parties). Others taking this more positive viewpoint to generally
accept that rebel groups are bound by international humanitarian law as well as state
practice of concluding agreements with other non-state groups include indigenous
peoples and national liberation movements. See Tom Grant, Who Can Make Treaties:
Other Subjects of International Law, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 125, 133–34
(Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (indigenous peoples); Daragh Murray, How International
Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups, 20 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
101, 101–02 (2015) (humanitarian law); Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 3: International
Agreements Not Within the Scope of the Present Convention, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 49, 69 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,
2012) (national liberation movements).
128. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 116, at 949.
129. See White, supra note 109, at 148–49.
130. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 1, 6 (May 17, 1994) (expressing both reaffirmation
of the United Nations commitment to the peacekeeping efforts (ex ante) in Rwanda,
and “stressing the importance” of the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement
(ex post)).
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agreements.131 The Council ordered non-state parties to abide by peace
agreements in 83% of those conflicts and in 92% of Chapter VII conflicts.132
Perhaps the strongest indication of the Council’s determination to treat
NIAC peace agreements as binding is the sanctions regimes it has created
to punish violation of the agreements. It did so in Liberia,133 Rwanda,134
Sierra Leone,135 Côte d’Ivoire,136 and the DR Congo.137
In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the Council strongly backed the
January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord to end a conflict that had
started the previous year.138 In May 2003, finding the situation in Côte
d’Ivoire to constitute a “threat to international peace,” the Council
established a peacekeeping mission “with a mandate to facilitate the
implementation by the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement.”139 The peace process had effectively collapsed by
November of that year, however, as rebel forces that refused to disarm
resumed fighting.140 In early 2004, the Council invoked Chapter VII to
call on the parties “to carry out expeditiously their responsibilities
under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.”141 On November 15, with
hostilities unabated, the Council invoked Chapter VII again to
emphasize “that there can be no military solution to the crisis and that
the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III
Agreements remains the only way to resolve the crisis persisting in the
country.”142 It imposed an arms embargo on the entire country and a

131. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
132. Id.
133. S.C. Res. 1521, ¶ 2(a) (Dec. 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1343, ¶ 14(b) (Mar. 7, 2001);
S.C. Res. 788, ¶ 8 (Nov. 19, 1992).
134. S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 5, 14(b)–(c) (May 17, 1994) (seeking to punish violations of
earlier peace agreements in Rwanda by increasing the presence of troops, as well as by
implementing an embargo against the importation of specific goods related to war making).
135. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6 (Oct. 8, 1997) (admonishing violations of peace treaties in
Sierra Leone by imposing an embargo on material for war making as well as petroleum).
136. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 6–7 (Nov. 15, 2004) (punishing violations of earlier peace
agreements in Côte D’Ivoire by strengthening the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the
area and imposing an embargo on war making material).
137. S.C. Res. 1596, ¶ 1 (May 3, 2005); S.C. Res. 1493, ¶¶ 6, 18, 20 (July 28, 2003).
138. S.C. Res. 1464, 1, ¶ 1 (Feb. 4, 2003) (endorsing the agreement and calling on
“all Ivorian political forces to implement it fully and without delay”).
139. S.C. Res. 1479, ¶ 2 (May 13, 2003).
140. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2004/42 (Nov. 6, 2004) (demanding cessation of all
military activities without success).
141. S.C. Res. 1527, ¶ 4 (Feb. 4, 2004).
142. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 3 (Nov. 15, 2004).
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travel ban and asset freeze “in particular [on] those who block the
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements.”143
3.

Conclusions
Council practice evidences scant willingness to excuse or ignore
non-state actors’ violation of NIAC peace agreements.144 The Council
consistently asserts that compliance is essential and punishes the most
egregious violations with sanctions.145 While the Council has not
explicitly described the agreements as binding under international
law, the logic of the Council’s post-conflict strategy would be difficult
to understand if it regarded the agreements as optional. The
agreements contain all the obligations of the parties later approved
and elaborated upon in resolutions: demobilization of combatants,
promotion of human rights and democratic institutions, constitutional
reforms, and a host of other conflict-abatement devices.146 An option
to back out of these commitments would undo all subsequent Council
actions. The Council’s contribution to an uncertain question of treaty
law thus clearly supports that the agreements are binding and as such
is evidence of customary international law.
As with the human rights obligations of non-state actors, questions
follow about how one would conceptualize non-state actors’
responsibility for breaching NIAC peace agreements.147 While this
Article does not explore that complex question, a more
straightforward consequence of viewing the agreements as binding is
that amnesty provisions—such as the Lomé Agreement—might be
successfully invoked in national or international courts. Another is
that breach of a binding agreement by a non-state party might more
143. Id. ¶ 9.
144. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
145. One could certainly go farther and argue that Council resolutions make the
agreements binding. See Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, Are Agreements between States and
Non-State Entities Rooted in the International Legal Order?, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 1, 18 (arguing that the Council extends
legitimacy to peace agreements between states and non-state actors by endorsing those
peace agreements and granting them a place in the “international order”).
146. E.g., Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, art. 7, ¶ 4, January 23,
2003, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_030123_Linas
MarcousisAgreement.pdf; accord S.C. Res. 1464, ¶¶ 1, 9 (Feb. 4, 2003) (endorsing and
expanding upon the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to end fighting in the Côte
D’Ivoire).
147. See Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener, Engaging Non-State Armed Actors
in State- and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 603, 618
(2011) (exploring NGO practices on convincing non-state actors to comply with
international norms).
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clearly relieve third party guarantors—such as the United Nations or a
regional organization—of obligations under the agreement. Yet a
third is that breach by a state party could lead to state responsibility.
C.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The reconstruction of states emerging from NIACs presents an
extraordinary challenge. The NIACs in our data set are among the
longest and most deadly of the post-Cold War era.148 In addition, they
have frequently cleaved states along ethnic, religious, or political lines,
calling into question the states’ capacity to function as cohesive
political units even after conflict has abated.149 To return the states’
governing institutions to full function—or to create fully functional
institutions if they did not exist prior to the conflict—requires building
trust across deep lines of social division.150 Popular acceptance of a
new national politics normalizes negotiated peace, allows for stability,
and lessens the possibility that violence will relapse.151 Factions whose
members have internalized the mutual antagonism of sub-state
identities are often incapable of building national institutions that
benefit both themselves and their opponents,152 hence the need for
external assistance.153
Building a functional state requires addressing a broad range of
issues, which complicates isolating the normative aspects of postconflict reconstruction. Some aspects of reconstruction cannot be
easily connected to a defined norm or set of norms in international
law; the demobilization of combatants, the rebuilding of
infrastructure, and the resumption of normal economic activity, for

148. See Paul Collier et al., On the Duration of Civil War, 41 J. PEACE RES. 253, 259 (2004)
(examining, through an econometric method, how long civil wars last and the reasons why
some last longer than others); see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
149. See STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 14, 390 (2006)
(providing an overview of cleavages in civil war).
150. C.f. Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing Peace: Power-Sharing
and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 318, 322 (2003) (examining
the severity of deficits in trust following civil wars, specifically noting salient causal
factors such as death tolls).
151. MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE:
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 19 (2006).
152. See Christoph Zürcher, Building Democracy While Building Peace, 22 J. DEMOCRACY
81, 82 (2011) (addressing how in many cases, the parties to a conflict may alone be
unable to reach successful and fair democratic arrangements post-conflict,
necessitating the presence of international actors).
153. Id.
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example, are not the subject of normative obligations.154 But other
reforms now typical of reconstruction draw heavily on human rights.
The reconstitution of justice systems and the ways in which nations
determine the best means for addressing violations by prior regimes
are two prevalent examples.155 Often these efforts are embedded in a
process of creating a new constitutional order for the state.156 Our data
show that in post-1990 conflicts with peacekeeping missions and
binding or potentially binding resolutions, the Council directed the
missions to protect human rights in 58% of conflicts and 82% of those
that invoked Chapter VII.157
1.

State of the law
The normative undertaking that best captures the contemporary
approach to post-conflict reconstruction is the creation of democratic
processes as embodied in free and fair elections.158 Elections
institutionalize principles of inclusion and seek to build citizen loyalty
to post-conflict states as opposed to ethnic or other sub-state
identities.159 Viewing elections as a post-conflict stabilization tool
began in the post-Cold War era as part of a broader ascendance of
154. See Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 119, 131
(2010) (finding that the Transitional Authority in Cambodia only participated in
reconstruction of infrastructure and demobilization of combatants at the behest of the
Council, not as a generally accepted norm).
155. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of
Conflict, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009); see also Elena Baylis,
What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives,
14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243, 277 (2015) (discussing how rebuilding justice
systems post-conflict challenges “internationals” because each instance is unique and
in many ways influenced by the nation’s pre-conflict government structure).
156. See JAMAL BENOMAR, CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND PEACE BUILDING: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESSES OF POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 6
(2003) (addressing issues related to post-war constitutional construction, including
the importance of having the right parties at the table and the importance of drafting
interim agreements along the way); UNITED NATION DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP
GUIDANCE NOTE ON CONSTITUTION-MAKING SUPPORT 3 (2014) [hereinafter UNDP
GUIDANCE] (explaining that rebuilding post-conflict political processes promotes
accountability, rule of law, and protection of human rights).
157. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
158. See UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 28
(2008) (identifying effective elections as an important step in the process of
rehabilitating a nation after a civil war).
159. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 46, 58–59 (1992) (stating that allowing everyone to vote, as opposed to limiting
the privilege to a small group or certain territory, turns an exclusionary practice into
a universal participatory right).
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participatory rights; an idea Professor Thomas Franck labelled the
Built on human rights treaty
“democratic entitlement.”160
commitments to free and fair elections and the increasingly
widespread practice of election monitoring by the United Nations and
regional organizations, the entitlement found additional support in
General Assembly resolutions, membership criteria of international
organizations, and decisions of international tribunals.161 The Council
also made frequent reference to the need for democratic transitions in
states in which it was engaged.162
But applying the democratic entitlement to post-conflict societies
has proven difficult and controversial.163 While the United Nations has
promoted elections as essential to legitimacy of the new political order,
critics have pointed out the potential dangers accompanying electoral
competition held immediately after conflict ends.164 Scholars of
international affairs argue that quick elections in states emerging from
ethno-nationalist conflicts are positively correlated with a return to
conflict.165 This widely-discussed claim has given rise to a debate over
how the timing and design of post-conflict elections should relate to
other reconstruction imperatives—such as establishing security and
creating effective state institutions—that will affect the perceived
legitimacy of elections.166 The question of whether the democratic
160. Id. at 46.
161. See Gregory H. Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, in THE MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 122, at 15, 19
(examining the usefulness of U.N. agencies and affiliates in enforcing democratic
ideals in a nation); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 48 (Gregory H. Fox &
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Fox, Right to Political Participation] (raising
questions about what effect the fostering of democratic ideals in post-conflict countries
has on the idea of a democratic entitlement).
162. See Gregory H. Fox, Democratization, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD
WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 69, 72 (David Malone ed., 2003) (addressing the trend in recent
decades towards democracy as the de facto preferred form of national governance);
Francesco Mancini, Promoting Democracy, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY, supra note 67, at 235, 240, 249 (demonstrating instances in which the
Council specifically urged referenda or elections to take place in post-conflict nations).
163. See generally Fox, supra note 9, at 180 (injecting a legal perspective into an
already fraught debate over the effectiveness and desirability of promoting democratic
institutions in post-conflict states).
164. See JACK L. SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
NATIONALIST CONFLICT 32 (2000) (examining the risks of nationalism in electoral
contests held shortly after the end of a civil war).
165. See id.
166. See UNDP GUIDANCE, supra note 156, at 24 (“In post conflict countries in
particular, there is often a strong push for a speedy constitutional review process . . . .
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entitlement extends to the immediate post-conflict transitional period
thus remains controversial.
2.

Security Council practice
Supporting and facilitating democratic transitions has been an
important part of the Security Council’s strategy for post-conflict states.
In 63% of all NIACs with Chapter VII, the Council tasked a
peacekeeping mission with assisting in the creation of democratic
institutions.167 For Chapter VII conflicts, 71% were tasked to assist in
the transformation of national institutions, 65% with establishing the
rule of law, and 53% with supporting free and fair elections.168
Resolutions authorizing peacekeeping missions in East Timor,169
Mali,170 Sudan,171 South Sudan,172 Liberia,173 Somalia,174 and elsewhere
affirm the Council’s belief in the palliative effect of democratic
transitions on formerly warring factions.175 The clearest examples of
the Council approving electoral democracy as appropriate for postconflict states are the so-called international territorial administrations
of the 1990s in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia.176 These involved
international actors directing elaborate democratic reform initiatives,
involving not only elections but also wholesale constitutional revisions
designed to embed pluralism and tolerance into the political culture.177
However, experience from numerous constitutional processes indicates that short
deadlines are almost never met in reality and, in fact, are often a hindrance to the
broader goal of designing a constitution which reflects the will of the people, and is
based on meaningful consultations with a broad cross-section of society.”); U.N.
Secretary-General, Identical Letters dated 17 June 2005 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, ¶ 141 (June 17, 2015) (acknowledging that
calling for elections too early in a nation’s rehabilitative process may have adverse
effects that lead to further bloodshed and war).
167. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
168. Id.
169. S.C. Res. 1704, ¶ 1 (Aug. 25, 2006).
170. S.C. Res. 2100, ¶ 4 (Apr. 25, 2013).
171. S.C. Res. 1881, ¶ 1 (Aug. 6, 2009); S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 2005).
172. S.C. Res. 1996, ¶ 1 (July 8, 2011).
173. S.C. Res. 2066, ¶ 1 (Sept. 17, 2012).
174. S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 1 (May 2, 2013).
175. Each of these resolutions either invoked Chapter VII, described the situation
as a “threat to the peace,” or “decided” to grant the mission a pro-democracy mandate,
meaning they were all coded as imposing binding obligations.
176. See S.C. Res. 1272, ¶¶ 1–2 (Oct. 25, 1999) (East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11
(June 10, 1999) (Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1031, ¶ 6 (Dec. 15, 1995) (Bosnia).
177. See GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 115–17 (2008) (exploring
why the international community rejected models of statehood and implemented

2018]

NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

683

3.

Conclusions
Despite skepticism about the utility or desirability of moving postconflict states decisively toward electoral democracy, Council practice
shows no diversion in these settings from the broader democratic
entitlement.178 Certainly none of its missions have promoted alternative
forms of governance. The Council has engaged with issues of democracy
almost exclusively in the context of post-conflict reconstruction,179
evidencing a strong and consistent commitment to promotion of
democratic solutions in divided societies. While other U.N. bodies
have warned repeatedly against imposing externally designed models
of democratic government on post-conflict states,180 the Council
apparently views immediate democratic transitions to be essential.
Because this norm also has political character, the Council’s practice
in the area is evidence of an emerging customary norm, although the
norm is not as well developed as the examples of human rights norms
and non-state actors, and the status of peace agreements.
IV.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATE OVER NEW LAW:
A JUS AD BELLUM FOR NIACS?

In addition to addressing the long-standing legal debates discussed
in Section III, the Council has also weighed in on a new issue: whether
NIAC parties have a jus ad bellum obligation to cease hostilities.
A.

The Council’s Challenge to a Purely Inter-State Jus Ad Bellum

One of the most common obligations the Council has imposed on
NIAC parties is to cease hostilities entirely. It did so in 82% of all
NIACs in which it invoked Chapter VII and in 100% of such NIACs that
commitments to pluralism and democracy in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia); Kristen
Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary
Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 293, 298 (2005) (discussing postconflict legislative agendas that include democratic reforms).
178. Mancini, supra note 162, at 243 (noting that despite wide-spread criticism on
the Council’s use of democracy promotion, the Council has been devoted to creating
free and fair elections since 2002 under Chapter VII).
179. See, e.g., Roland Rich, Situating the UN Democracy Fund, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
423, 426 (2010) (finding that the three most recent U.N.-Secretaries General have
prioritized democracy building).
180. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: ORIENTATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT 3 (2006),
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governancedevelopment/For%20WEB%20Accountability%20and%20democratic%20governanc
e%20Orientations%20and%20principles%20for%20development.pdf (noting that
outside states cannot impose on other states a “one-size-fits-all” plan for development).
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began after 1990.181 These demands are unconditional and exceptions
are quite rare,182 though several are discussed below.183 The Council
has even demanded that both parties end fighting in conflicts where
one side has committed extraordinarily brutal acts, and the Council
itself has denounced the brutality.184 Echoing canonical language in
the U.N. Charter addressing inter-state disputes, the Council often
explains that there can be no military solution to domestic disputes
and urges parties either to engage in peace talks or adhere to peace
agreements already negotiated.185 In Georgia, for example, the
Council declared that the parties’ differences “must be addressed
through negotiations and by peaceful means only.”186 In Sudan, it
declared that “there can be no military solution to the conflict in
Darfur, and that an inclusive political settlement . . . [is] essential to reestablishing peace in Darfur.”187 Where a peace agreement has been
concluded and Chapter VII invoked, the Council demanded the
parties adhere to the agreement in 92% of all NIACs.188
Imposing an obligation not to resolve internal conflicts by force
raises the question of whether the Council is effectively articulating a
181. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
182. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2053, at 1 (June 27, 2012) (asking that “all armed groups”
stop acts of violence); S.C. Res. 1872, ¶ 5 (May 26, 2009) (acting under Chapter VII, the
Council condemned the return of hostilities that were being undertaken to frustrate the
efforts of the Transitional Federal Government); S.C. Res. 1834, ¶ 12 (Sept. 24, 2008)
(demanding that armed groups discontinue violence); S.C. Res. 884, ¶ 4 (Nov. 12,
1993) (commanding the parties to desist in armed conflict); S.C. Res. 785, ¶ 3 (Oct.
30, 1992) (rejecting any revival of hostilities and demanding an end to hostilities).
183. See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
184. In Rwanda, for example, the Council demanded on June 8, 1994 that “all
parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire[,] and immediately take
steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control.” S.C. Res. 925,
¶ 6 (June 8, 1994). The genocide in Rwanda began in early April and did not fully
end until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took Kigali on July 4. See GÉRARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 291–95 (1995). Indeed, the
major reason for its cessation was the RPF wresting control of territory from Hutu
extremists. Id. at 291–99. Yet, Resolution 925 demanded both that “all parties” cease
hostilities and noted “with the gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of
genocide have occurred in Rwanda.” S.C. Res. 925, at 1, ¶ 6 (June 8, 1994). The
Rwanda episode is arguably in tension with the exception for force used to halt mass
human rights violations identified below. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
185. “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1881, ¶ 8 (Aug. 6, 2009); S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 18
(July 31, 2007); S.C. Res. 1202, ¶ 3 (Oct. 15, 1998); S.C. Res. 1016, ¶ 6 (Sept. 21, 1995).
186. S.C. Res. 1311, ¶ 5 (July 28, 2000).
187. S.C. Res. 1828, ¶ 9 (July 31, 2008).
188. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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set of jus ad bellum norms189—for NIACs.190 In this Section, we argue
that the Council appears to have done so in the form of a general
prohibition with several exceptions. Of all Council-imposed norms
explored in our data, this would be the most radical departure from
existing international law.191 The canonical modern expression of the
jus ad bellum in U.N. Charter Article 2(4) applies by its terms only to
inter-state conflicts;192 ICJ descriptions of the jus ad bellum in customary
law are purely statist193 and widely-accepted definitions of aggression
from the General Assembly194 and the statute of the International

189. The jus ad bellum is traditionally the body of norms defining when a state may resort
to military force. What Are Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello?, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Jan.
22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0.
190. See KIRSTI SAMUELS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 131 (2007) (advancing that Council
practice of demanding peaceful resolution of domestic disputes “provides important
evidence of the normative and moral views of the international community on
recourse to force in civil conflict”). As noted, in some cases the Council phrases its
demand for cessation in general terms, and in others it demands that parties adhere
to peace agreements. One might argue that only the former contributes to an internal
jus ad bellum because in the latter cases the Council is simply demanding the parties
adhere to commitments they themselves have created, not those imposed by international
law. Note this argument assumes the peace agreements are binding, an issue discussed
above. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. If they are not binding then
the distinction is illusory. Even if they are binding, the Council could hardly order
one party to adhere to the terms of a treaty that the other party had materially
breached. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 60.
191. The opposing view on this issue is entirely plausible, but assessing all the
contours of a potential internal jus ad bellum is well beyond the scope of this Article.
See Christian Henderson & James A. Green, The Jus Ad Bellum and Entities Short of
Statehood in the Report on the Conflict in Georgia, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 129, 133 (2010)
(arguing that it is debatable whether the prohibition on the use of force is actually
endorsed by the U.N. Charter).
192. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
193. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 148–52 (Dec. 19); Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209 (June 27)
(finding that international customary law does not contain a general right to
intervene); see also Legality of Use by State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 31 (July 8) (declining to issue an advisory opinion
on states’ use of nuclear weapons to the World Health Organization).
194. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1974) (“Aggression is the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this Definition.” (emphasis added)).
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Criminal Court195 speak exclusively of inter-state uses of force.
Scholarly accounts are similarly unequivocal.196
The state-centrism of the jus ad bellum has deep historical roots in
nearly absolutist notions of protecting states’ autonomy to resolve
internal disputes without external interference.197 In this view, the
government enjoyed autonomy to put down challenges to its authority,
and a rebel group enjoyed autonomy to mount such a challenge,
sometimes referred to as the right to revolution.198 That a government
oppressed its citizens and suppressed their attempts to rise in protest
has not translated into a right of other states to intervene on behalf of
the regime’s opponents.199 But Council practice does not reflect a
clear distinction between limitations on the inter-state and intra-state
uses of force. Three aspects of Council practice have substantially
undermined the idea of a disinterested international community
standing aloof from NIACs. First, the various Council sanctions
regimes have created obligations for all states to target individuals and
groups defying a range of Council dictates to halt fighting or adhere

195. Resolution RC/Res.4, Attachment I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, art. 8 bis (1) (defining the
“crime of aggression” as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”).
196. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 6 (4th ed. 2005)
(excluding intra-State conflict entirely from analysis of legality of the use of force).
197. See Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 704 n.56 (2016)
(“International law professes to be concerned with the relations of states to each other.
Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a
civil war . . . are acts which have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such
relations.” (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (2d ed. 1884))).
198. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 832–33 (7th ed. 2014); see also
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, ¶ 20 (Mar. 13, 2004) (“There is no rule against
rebellion in international law.”).
199. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209 (June 27) (noting that there is nothing in
international customary law to justify state intervention on behalf of an opposition in
another state); see also Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, Humanitarian Intervention: The
Lessons Learned, 99 CURRENT HIST. 419, 420–21 (2000) (questioning whether
humanitarian intervention is lawful under the U.N. Charter because most legal
scholars argue that the U.N. Charter contains a general prohibition against
intervention under Article 2(4)).
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to prior peace agreements.200 The Council imposed sanctions in 73%
of NIACs with Chapter VII and in 83% of such conflicts that began
after 1990.201 While the specific acts triggering sanctions vary widely—
from violations of peace agreements, to refusal to cease hostilities, to
violations of human rights—each traces its origins to resolutions
imposing the non-use of force obligations described above.202 The
Council has thereby enlisted the entire international community in its
effort to coerce NIAC parties into resolving disputes peacefully.
The second aspect of Council practice that undermines the notion
that the international community is detached from NIACs is the
Council’s consistent but fraught choice to seek peaceful solutions to
conflicts in which the incentives for parties to cooperate are often quite
low. Studies of how NIACs end show that decisive military victories
produce longer periods of peace than negotiated settlements.203 That
the Council persists in a low-odds peacemaking strategy for NIACs
suggests a commitment to intervention despite strong practical
arguments for not doing so.
The third aspect of Council practice indicating the international
community’s interest in NIACs is the Council’s condemnation of
virtually every destructive consequence of the internal use of force.
This includes the targeting of civilians, women, and children; largescale internal displacements; the destruction of cultural property; the
abuse of human rights; and acts amounting to international crimes.204

200. E.g., S.C. Res. 1267, at 2, ¶ 3 (Oct. 15, 1999) (demanding that all states impose
sanctions against the Taliban because it failed to comply with the Council’s demand
to turn over Usama bin Laden).
201. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
202. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
203. Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36, 36, 44 (1999)
(arguing that ceasefires or peace agreements are simply a break in the conflict that
allows sides to rest and time to rearm, rather than leading to an effective peace
solution); see Fabio Andres Diaz & Syed Mansoob Murshed, “Give War A Chance”: AllOut War as a Means of Ending Conflict in the Cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia, 15 CIVIL
WARS 281, 283, 285–87 (2013) (examining data on peace agreements and return to
conflict, specifically considering both Colombia and Sri Lanka).
204. See S.C. Res. 2206, at 1 (Mar. 3, 2015) (condemning the large-scale
displacement of civilians in South Sudan conflict); S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 17 (Feb. 12, 2015)
(demanding an end to the continued destruction of cultural property in Iraq and
Syria); S.C. Res. 1894, at 1 (Nov. 11, 2009) (expressing regret for the targeting of
civilians in armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1612, at 1 (July 26, 2005) (recognizing the rights
of children in all armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1355, at 1 (June 15, 2001) (noting the
concern for human rights violations and atrocities against civilians in the DR Congo);
S.C. Res. 1325, at 2 (Oct. 31, 2000) (recognizing the importance of women’s and girls’
rights in all armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1231, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 1998) (calling on
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The marginal difference in intrusion on state autonomy between these
interventions and an appropriately limited internal jus ad bellum hardly
matches an absolutist view that internal uses of force are wholly beyond
international regulation.205
B.

The Nature of an Internal Jus Ad Bellum in Council Practice

If the Council now treats the fact of NIACs as an issue of legitimate
international concern and views an immediate end to hostilities as its
preeminent objective, then have its views coalesced into discernable
norms? The few scholars who have explored a jus ad bellum regime for
NIACs have not placed particular emphasis on Council practice. Kjell
Anderson grounds the idea in an individual right to peace.206 Eliav
Lieblich proposes a norm extrapolated from the human right to life.207
Timothy Waters proposes a more limited focus on “protectable
territory” within a state, intervention into which would trigger an
international law violation.208
Exploring all the contours of a fully-developed internal jus ad bellum
is well beyond the scope of this Article. Given the embryonic state of
the law in this area, any suggested norm would need to be a modest
one. Thus, we follow the inter-state jus ad bellum by identifying the
general prohibition on force that it creates, augmented by several
exceptions. The breadth of the rule’s exceptions recognizes its
revolutionary nature. Three exceptions are suggested by commentators
and grounded in Council practice, while a fourth is the Council’s alone.

perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone NIAC
to be brought to justice).
205. This claim is not an effort to collapse the jus ad bellum/jus in bello distinction.
The cited condemnations by the Council all fit formally or notionally within the jus in
bello. But the state autonomy claim does not map clearly on to this distinction. Its
broad invocation of a zone of domestic discretion appears rather hollow if it asserts
only a right to resort to internal force but not the right to use that force in the way
domestic actors see fit.
206. See Kjell Anderson, The Universality of War: Jus ad Bellum and the Right to Peace
in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 52, 52 (David Keane & Yvonne McDermott eds., 2012).
207. Lieblich, supra note 197, at 743.
208. Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the Georgian War
Through the Distorting Lens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 176, 229 (2013) (proposing
a norm that would focus on “identifying territorial lines with a functional status equal
to an international frontier in relation to the use of force—territory whose violation
would allow the kinds of responses that are automatically available in true international
conflicts. This would create, within a single state, differentiated sovereignties derived
directly from the territorial aspects of conflict”).
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1.

Self-defense exception
The first exception is for force used in self-defense, paralleling the
Either a governmental or a noninterstate jus ad bellum.209
governmental actor could use force in response to a prior use of force
against its members.210 In Afghanistan, for example, after expressing
“its concern about the security situation . . . , in particular the
increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban [and] AlQaida,” the Council called upon the Afghan government “to address
the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the
Taliban [and] Al-Qaida.”211 In DR Congo, the Security Council gave
the U.N. Organization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC)
peacekeeping force a mandate to work “in close cooperation” with the
government—specifically with its armed forces—to protect civilians
from attacks by armed militias, to disarm those militias, and to “disrupt
the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use
violence.”212 In both cases, the Council legitimated forceful responses
to prior attacks.213
2.

Exceptions for furthering democratic legitimacy and halting mass
violations of human rights
But a blanket exception for self-defense would take no account of
the reasons force had been used in the first place. An oppressive

209. A minimum threshold requirement would distinguish attacks triggering a right
of self-defense from legitimate acts of law enforcement, crowd control, or the quelling
of civil unrest. Elian Lieblich usefully equates this threshold with that in the inter-state
jus ad bellum: “resort to internal hostilities can only be undertaken in self-or-otherdefense against a prior use of force itself amounting to hostilities.” Lieblich, supra
note 197, at 740.
210. The threshold could also be described as an “armed attack” per U.N. Charter article
51. Additionally, the right of self-defense would be limited to responses to the first attack. As
is often remarked in the inter-state context, there is no self-defense to self-defense.
211. S.C. Res. 1806, at 2, ¶ 11 (Mar. 20, 2008); see also S.C. Res. 2041, ¶ 23 (Mar. 22,
2012) (using similar language for Afghan conflict); S.C. Res. 1234, at 1, ¶ 4 (Apr. 4,
1999) (expressing concern over “measures taken by forces opposing the Government
in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and calling for “the reestablishment of the authority of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo throughout its territory”).
212. S.C. Res. 1856, ¶¶ 3, 3(a), 3(f) (Dec. 22, 2008); see also S.C. Res. 2076, ¶ 3 (Nov.
20, 2012) (condemning the attempts from the March 23 Movement “to establish an
illegitimate parallel administration and to undermine State authority of the
Government of the [DR Congo]”).
213. See S.C. Res. 1856, at 1, ¶ 3 (Dec. 22, 2008) (allowing the use of force in the
DR Congo for the promotion of international security); S.C. Res. 1806, ¶¶ 3, 4 (Mar.
20, 2008) (authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan to protect its civilians).
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government attacked by a pro-democratic insurgency and a genocidal
insurgency attacked by a democratic government would be equally
entitled to respond to attacks with force. Ignoring the equities involved
in such conflicts would effectively replicate international law’s traditional
abnegation of interest in NIACs.214 Council practice suggests two further
exceptions that would temper the self-defense exception to account for
the nature and goals of the regime or rebel group involved: the use of
force to further democratic legitimacy215 and the use of force to resist
mass human rights violations.216 A narrowly-drawn democratic
legitimacy exception would apply to a regime—incumbent or ousted—
seeking to vindicate an electoral victory deemed free and fair by
external observers, preferably from the United Nations.217
The idea of democratic legitimacy now has deep roots in Council
practice, as well as that of other U.N. bodies.218 The Council supported
free and fair elections in 53% of NIACs in our data set in which
Chapter VII was invoked.219 Twice—in Haiti in 1994 and Sierra Leone
in 1997—the Council approved of military force to oust regimes that

214. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2002), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/law10_final.pdf (describing how historical state practice such as disallowing
interference in domestic affairs in conjunction with U.N. Charter article 2(7) and
preventing U.N. intervention in internal affairs work together to elucidate
international law’s disinterest in NIACs).
215. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1706, at 2, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Aug. 31, 2006) (authorizing the use of
force in Darfur after expressing concern for the safety of humanitarian aid workers
and the Darfur population); see also S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2011) (allowing the
U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire to “use all necessary measures” to prevent the
continued attacks against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire).
217. See SAMUELS, supra note 190, at 117–21 (detailing Council practice of rejecting
“political violence against democratically elected governments”).
218. See Jean d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.& POL. 877, 887 (2006) (finding that after the Cold War,
democracy has been viewed as the more legitimate form of government);
Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, supra note 161, at 15 (showing
democracy to be of importance to the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States); Fox, Right to Political Participation, supra note 161, at 32 (contending
that the idea of democratic entitlement began with the U.N. Charter and became a
seemingly legitimate practice within bodies like the General Assembly);
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL,
GUIDANCE
NOTE
ON
DEMOCRACY
1
(2009),
https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/file_att
ach/UNSG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy-EN.pdf (noting that all
states could benefit from democracy).
219. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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had overthrown democratically elected leaders.220 An additional
exception for force intended to halt mass human rights violations
would limit claims of self-defense when used as either justification or
cover for such violations.221 This exception would be grounded in two
aspects of Council practice in NIACs: its frequent condemnation of
human rights violations222 and its authorization of the use of force—in
whole or in part—to redress the violation of human rights.223
3.

Exception for anti-terrorism actions
Finally, the Council has indicated support for internal uses of force
designed to defeat terrorist groups or those affiliated with terrorists.224

220. See S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 1 (Oct. 8, 1997) (demanding, under Chapter VII, that “the
military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way
for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to
constitutional order”); S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4 (July 31, 1994) (authorizing, under Chapter
VII, the creation of a multilateral force “to use all necessary means to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island
Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti”);
see also S.C. Res. 1181, at 1 (July 13, 1998) (commending the Economic Community of
West African States’s (ECOWAS) role in re-establishing the democratic process in
Sierra Leone); S.C. Pres. Statement 1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that after the
ECOWAS force deposed the Sierra Leone junta, the Council had “welcome[d] the fact
that the rule of the military junta [had] been brought to an end”).
221. See JAN ARNO HESSBRUEGGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333–34 (2017) (arguing that allowing a right to resist mass
atrocities could limit violence for forcing those launching an attack to provide a legal
justification for the aggression).
222. The Council condemned human rights violations in 71% of NIACs in which
Chapter VII was invoked and 80% of such conflicts that started after 1990. UN Security
Council Data Set, supra note 13. Peacekeeping missions were given mandates to protect
human rights in 82% of NIACs with Chapter VII. Id.
223. Examples include interventions authorized under Chapter VII in several
countries. See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (Libya); S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3 (Sept.
15, 1999) (East Timor); S.C. Res. 1101, ¶ 4 (Mar. 28, 1997) (Albania); S.C. Res. 940, ¶
4 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 929, ¶¶ 3, 4 (June 22, 1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res.
836, ¶ 8 (June 4, 1993) (Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 794, ¶¶ 7, 10 (Dec. 3,
1992) (Somalia). See generally Inger Österdahl, The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on
Force and Human Rights by the UN Security Council, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 1, 1–2
(2005) (arguing that the only response that the U.N. Security Council has to every
situation is using humanitarian intervention); George Weber, The Humanitarian and
Human Right Duties of the United Nations Security Council, 1 U. BALT. J. INT’L L. 221, 223
(2013) (examining how the Security Council has responded to human rights’ abuses).
224. In the inter-state setting, the Council has suggested, though not
uncontroversially, that attacks by terrorist groups give rise to a right of self-defense
whether or not the attacks can be attributed to the host state. See S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1
(Nov. 20, 2015) (noting that ISIL “has the capability and intention to carry out further
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The central example is Mali, where the Council sided with an elected
government in conflict with rebel groups in the north of the country,
several of which the Council identified as having ties to terrorist
organizations.225 After France intervened to assist the government in
early January 2013, the Council welcomed “the swift action by the
French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali, to
stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist[,] and armed groups towards
the south of Mali.”226 The Council thus endorsed the government’s
use of force to defeat the terrorist-affiliated groups.
C.

Conclusions

Council practice thus suggests a general condemnation of force used
in NIACs with exceptions for self-defense and force used to restore
democratically elected regimes to end mass human rights violations
and to defeat terrorist or terrorist-affiliated groups. Much would need
to change in the contemporary jus ad bellum and cognate fields of
international law for limitations on the internal use of force to take
hold. But the Council’s own preferences seem clear.
V.

SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE AS EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The patterns in Security Council practice we have described may be
relevant to customary international law if the Council has a role in the
attacks and regards all such acts of terrorism as a threat to peace and security”);
S.C. Res. 1373, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2001) (affirming the right of self-defense in light of
September 11 attacks); see also S.C. Res. 1368, at 1 (Sept. 12, 2001) (reiterating the
right under the U.N. Charter of states to individual or collective self-defense); Thomas
M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right to Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 839–40 (2001)
(finding that the United Nations passed a resolution the day of the 9/11 attack in New
York to demonstrate that it recognizes a right to self-defense). But see Legal
Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 139 (July 9) (noting that there is no right of self-defense to
acts of terrorism by non-state actor).
225. See S.C. Res. 2085, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2012); see also S.C. Res. 2056, ¶ 23 (July 5,
2012) (authorizing an African Union mission to Somalia, established under Chapter
VII, to take “all necessary measures” to defend the fragile Transitional Federal
Government against the Al Shabaab group); S.C. Res. 2036, at 2, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2012)
(condemning attacks on the government “by armed opposition groups, and foreign
fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, and stressing that Somali armed opposition groups and
foreign fighters . . . constitute a terrorist threat to Somalia, and the international
community” and authorizing African Union mission to take the necessary steps to
coordinate with Somali security forces and reduce the threat posed by opposition groups).
226. S.C. Res. 2100, at 1 (Apr. 25, 2013); see also S.C. Res. 2227, at 3 (June 29, 2015)
(endorsing the continued use of French forces to defeat terrorist threats in Mali).
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creation of custom. In this Part, we describe a theory of how the
Council participates in customary law-making. First, this Part describes
the Council’s unique position in the architecture of international
peace and security law that endows its views on armed conflict with a
particular salience. Second, it describes how the Council has used that
position in practice regarding NIACs both to intervene in conflicts
more frequently than states acting individually or in groups and to
impose a consistent set of obligations on NIAC parties over time.
Third, it asks how aggregated Council practice can be seen as fulfilling
the two elements of custom traditionally required of state action:
practice and opinion juris. Finally, this Part addresses two common
objections to Council resolutions that serve as evidence of custom.
Because we view Council resolutions as evidence of customary law, we
do not argue that resolutions themselves create custom.227 Council
resolutions are simply one of the various forms of evidence to be
assessed in determining the existence and content of a customary
norm.228 The vigorous debate on the four substantive issues we discuss
above229 results from the evidence on each issue being both diverse and
inconclusive. In our view, the addition of Council practice could in
some cases affect the outcome of those debates.
A.

Acts of International Organizations as a Source of Custom

Custom is traditionally understood as primarily emanating from the
acts of individual states.230 But as international organizations assume
227. Few sources of custom create new norms on their own. The exception would
be so-called “instant custom,” which is quite rare. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 435 (1983).
228. In Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 6, 2006), for example, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights reviewed decisions and statutes of
international tribunals, resolutions of the General Assembly, views of the U.N.
Secretary-General, and resolutions of the Council to conclude that national amnesties
for crimes against humanity are invalid. Id. ¶¶ 105–14. Similarly, in Tadić, the ICTY
Appellate Body considered national military manuals, national legislation, agreements
concluded by the ICRC, and Council resolutions (which it deemed “of great
relevance”) to find that individual criminal responsibility could attach to violations of
basic humanitarian law principles applicable to internal conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadić,
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128–36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
229. See supra notes 209–26 (examining exceptions to the general prohibition on
force created under the inter-state jus ad bellum).
230. See, e.g., ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 76 (contending that
states form international customary laws through their practices, “or expression, of
rules of customary international law”). In Jurisdictional Immunities of state (Ger. v. It.;
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an increasingly prominent role in global policymaking, the case for
viewing their practice as evidence of custom has gained strength.231
Broadly stated, the argument is that if international organizations are
now understood to have the international legal personality necessary
to perform a wide variety of functions previously reserved to states,
there is no reason to ignore the implications for customary law that
follow from the organizations’ exercise of that personality.232 The ICJ
has cited General Assembly resolutions as evidence of custom on issues
such as the permissible use of force, non-intervention, and the legality
of the use of nuclear weapons.233 Other international tribunals have
cited General Assembly resolutions as evidence of custom on different
issues.234 The ILC recently accepted a version of this claim in

Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3), the ICJ held that it is “State
practice from which customary international law is derived.” Id. ¶ 101.
231. See Jed Odermatt, The Development of Customary International Law by International
Organizations, 66 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 491, 496 (2017) (suggesting that the concept that
states and international organizations help form international customary law should
not be contentious); Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 82, at 116 (recognizing that
it has become accepted practice to allow non-governmental organizations to create
international law). Judge Takana was an early advocate of this position. See South West
Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 291 (July 18)
(Tanaka, J., dissenting) (arguing that the traditional individualistic, statist conception
of custom developed through repetitive actions by States will change to adapt to the
new “parliamentary diplomacy” method of generating custom through actions of
“organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, with their
agencies and affiliated institutions); see also Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur),
Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, at 25 n.120, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (collecting various supportive separate opinions of ICJ
judges opining on the creation of custom by non-governmental, international bodies).
232. Mathias, supra note 23, at 26 (introducing the idea that once the ICJ has noted
that international organizations have distinct characteristics and rights, the ILC might
also determine whether they have an effect on customary international law).
233. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 162 (Dec. 19); Legality of Use by State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 1 (July 8) (asking the
court for an opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons is acceptable); Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary
International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 576 (2016)
(noting the “widely-held view that U.N. General Assembly resolutions are evidence of
customary international law”).
234. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 475 (1991) (reviewing
arbitral decisions on the standard for expropriated property that rely heavily on
General Assembly resolutions).

2018]

NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

695

provisional “conclusions” on the identification of customary law.235
The ILC position is hesitant but supportive, acknowledging that in
“certain cases, the practice of international organizations also
contributes to [custom].”236 The Commission elaborates that while a
resolution of an international organization “cannot, of itself, create a
rule of customary international law[,] . . . [a] resolution adopted by an
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may
provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule
of customary international law, or contribute to its development.”237
The ILC does not apply this general assessment—which we accept—
to the Council.238 Instead, in keeping with much contemporary
scholarship, it focuses almost exclusively on resolutions of the General
Assembly.239 This Section argues that such a limited focus is
unwarranted and that both the Council’s legal status and its extensive
history of addressing NIACs should bring its resolutions within the
ambit of the ILC’s general willingness to treat international
organization practice as evidence of custom.
It is first useful to understand how patterns of Council-imposed
obligations compare to General Assembly resolutions as evidence of
custom, since the latter are now well-accepted.240 One important factor
used in assessing the normative value of General Assembly
235. See ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 75–76. (noting that the
ILC’s adoption of conclusions evidencing international organizations’ contributions
to custom “proved to be quite controversial” within the ILC); Michael Wood,
International Organizations and Customary International Law, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
609, 616 (2015) (referencing the ILC’s controversial discussion on inclusion of
international organizations as contributors to custom).
236. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 76; see also JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 194 (8th ed. 2012) (noting that
the practice of the Council and General Assembly “may have considerable legal
significance”); Niels Blokker, International Organizations and Customary International
Law: Is the International Law Commission Taking International Organizations Seriously?,
14 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (noticing that the ILC considered international
organizations’ behavior when drafting general rules).
237. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 78.
238. In his Third Report, Michael Wood, the Special Rapporteur, mentions the
Council as an example of an international organization organ “with more limited
membership” whose resolutions “will generally have less weight in evidencing general
customary international law; they may, however, have a central role in the formation
and identification of particular custom.” Wood, Third Report, supra note 5, at 31–32.
239. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 107 (noting that General
Assembly resolutions are important to analyze because they reflect the state members’
opinions).
240. See Helfer & Wuerth, supra note 233, at 576 (noting that it is a well-accepted
idea that General Assembly resolutions contribute to international customary law).
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resolutions—repetition over time—finds clear resonance in the
patterns of Council-imposed obligations in our data.241 But in other
respects, Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions differ.
First and most obviously, Council resolutions are binding and General
Assembly resolutions are not.242 Second, General Assembly resolutions
may accurately reflect the views of all U.N. member states if all choose
to vote or a resolution is adopted by consensus while Council
resolutions come from an elite body of limited membership.243 Third,
the General Assembly resolutions usually cited as evidence of custom
are structured as treaty-like documents that describe a series of rights
and obligations phrased as rules of general application.244 A
prominent example is the 1974 Definition of Aggression, relied upon
in the Nicaragua case, which provides a detailed elaboration of when
a state’s unilateral use of force is unlawful.245 By contrast, the Council

241. See Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 70 (8 July) (suggesting that several similar and consecutive resolutions
might demonstrate the development of the “opinio juris” needed to solidify a new rule);
id. ¶ 73 (noting that “the adoption each year by the General Assembly, by a large
majority, of resolutions” on issues in nascent customary norm); see also UN Security
Council Data Set, supra note 13.
242. See U.N. Charter art. 10. (describing General Assembly resolutions as
“recommendations”).
243. James A. Paul, Security Council Reform: Arguments About the Future of the United
Nations System, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Feb. 6, 1995), https://www.globalpolicy.org/securitycouncil/security-council-reform/41128-veto-analysis.html (noting criticism of the
Council as an “elite group”).
244. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
245. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1 (Dec.
14, 1974); DINSTEIN, supra note 196, at 126 (calling the General Assembly’s definition
of aggression “the most widely (albeit not universally) accepted” definition (citation
omitted)). Many other resolutions containing broad conventions or directives have
this similar treaty-style formatting of listing rights as generally applicable rules. E.g.,
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, ch. 1 (Dec.
12, 1974) (demanding that States “shall” be governed by certain economic principles);
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nation, ¶ 1 (Oct. 24, 1970) (approving of a Declaration on Principles of
International Law); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1962) (declaring that people have a right to sovereignty over
their natural resources); G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1960) (using
preambular language to establish the right of individuals to dispose of their own
resources or wealth without prejudice); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, preamble (Dec. 10, 1948) (imposing as a rule in its preamble the
right of all individuals to their inherent dignity).
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resolutions in the data set are case-specific, describing only obligations
related to particular conflicts.246 This difference may be understood as
affecting the opinio juris value of the documents: the General Assembly
resolutions are assumed to be intended to affect customary law, while
no such assumption is made about the case-specific Council
resolutions. In sum, the resolutions most commonly-discussed
characteristics point in different directions: the first two support a
normative role for Council resolutions while second two do not.
B.

Council Attributes Supporting a Role in Creating Evidence of Custom

But noting these differences should not end the discussion. The
Council has its own positive attributes, not shared by the General
Assembly, that support treating its consistent practice as evidence of
custom. The following Sections examine these attributes, which fall
into two broad categories: the unique structural role of the Council as
the premier international body addressing armed conflict, including
NIACs, and the Council’s consistent practice of imposing similar
obligations in virtually all contemporary NIACs.
1.

The Council’s unique role in peace and security law
Treating Council resolutions as evidence of customary law is, first
and foremost, a function of the Council’s role in the law of international
peace and security.247 To ignore or marginalize Council practice, treating
it as no more important than or, potentially, less important than state
practice, would be inconsistent with the central role in conflict
mitigation that states have already assigned to the Council.
a. Authority to legitimize or condemn uses of force
First, the Council has the unique authority to legitimize or condemn
uses of force by states. Inter-state uses of force that might otherwise
not qualify as self-defense—the sole justification for unilateral action
found in the Charter—may be rendered lawful by Council approval;248
instances of humanitarian intervention are prominent examples.249
246. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
247. See Öberg, supra note 24, at 897 (indicating that the United Nations creates
customary international law and does not simply interpret or restate it).
248. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize
the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 530 (2005) (explaining the Council’s expansive
interpretation of its authority to legitimize and delegitimize state uses of force and
asserting that the authority lies in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter).
249. See RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 226 (2d ed. 2017) (describing
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Similarly, interventions that might otherwise have colorable claims to
legality can be authoritatively deemed unlawful by Council
condemnation.250 The Council’s dominant posture vis-à-vis states is
made most vivid by its ability to terminate otherwise lawful acts of selfdefense when it takes “measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”251 No state or group of states could lawfully
assume any of these Council powers.252
b. Binding state and non-state actors
Second, the Council has unique authority to bind those it addresses
in its resolutions. Any normative consequences of Council action rely,
at their core, on the Council’s ability to bind the specific actors it seeks
to influence.253 This power to bind is grounded in a series of interlocking Charter powers. Under Articles 24(1) and 25, U.N. member
states authorize the Council to act on their behalf when addressing
peace and security issues and agree to accept and carry out the
Council’s decisions.254 Chapter VII of the Charter allows the Council
to employ forceful measures to address breaches of peace and security
regardless of whether the issue would otherwise fall within a state’s

the movement to outlaw humanitarian intervention without U.N. approval). See
generally Fernando R. Tesón, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L.
323, 343–68 (1996) (detailing situations in which the Council allowed use of force for
collective humanitarian intervention, including in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia).
250. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N’s
Response to Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 453 (1991) (detailing how the
Council immediately condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait).
251. U.N. Charter art. 51. Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel long ago observed that
the record of the Charter’s drafting “is entirely inconsistent with the notion that, once
the Security Council has taken measures, individual members are supposed to remain
free to design their own military responses.” Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN
Police Action in Lieu of War: “The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 65 (1991).
252. DINSTEIN, supra note 196, at 283 (noting states’ limited right of self-defense under
the U.N. Charter stand in contrast to Council’s near unlimited authority to respond with
force to any form of aggression, even if it does not amount to an armed attack).
253. Of course, the Council may choose to issue non-binding resolutions under
Chapter VII of the Charter that impose no legal obligations. Efforts to resolve some
conflicts, such as Kashmir, are composed entirely of non-binding recommendations.
See Brian R. Farrell, The Security Council and Kashmir, 22 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 343, 357 (2013) (stating that the Council declined to bind Pakistan or India in
its resolutions on the Kashmir, instead calling on the states to find peaceful
resolutions).
254. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. Article 25 provides: “The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 25.
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domestic jurisdiction.255 The obligatory character of these measures is
not affected by conflicting obligations imposed by other treaties, as
Charter obligations are specifically accorded priority.256
Council obligations relating to NIACs are addressed to three classes
of actors: (i) state parties to a conflict; (ii) non-state parties to a
conflict; and (iii) states in the broader international community.257
While the first and third categories are innovative in the issues they
address, these obligations adhere to the traditionally statist conception
of Council authority. That Council “decisions” under Article 25 and
particularly those enacted under Chapter VII are binding on member
states—now every state in the world—is uncontroversial.258 Indeed, the
critical pushback that accompanied the Council’s rapid expansion of
its jurisdiction after the end of the Cold War was premised on the
perceived danger of an unaccountable Council imposing binding

255. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7, arts. 39–42. The obligation to accept and adhere to
Council decisions is repeated in Article 48 with specific regard to actions under
Chapter VII. U.N. Charter art. 48.
256. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, ¶ 331, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (explaining that
Article 103 of the Charter does not clearly define the primacy of Security Council
decisions, but this primacy “has been widely accepted in practice as well as in
doctrine”); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United Kingdom) and
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), in 2 MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW, WORLD COURT DIGEST, at 417, 418 (1997) [hereinafter Questions
of Interpretation] (“[I]n accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of
the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international
agreement . . . .”).
257. See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning violations by Syrian
government and non-state armed organizations); S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 20 (Sept. 27, 2013)
(directing the general international community to prevent those in the Syrian conflict
from procuring chemical weapons); S.C. Res. 1577, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (considering
appropriate measures for non-state actors party to the conflict in Burundi).
258. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 112 (June 21); Question of Interpretation,
supra note 256, at 418 (explaining the Council resolutions that bound the Libyan
government to take specific actions); 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 790, 795 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER] (describing how the binding nature of Council
decisions is derived from the language in Article 25).

700

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:649

obligations on weaker states.259 The binding nature of those
resolutions, in other words, was assumed even by the Council’s critics.
Since many of the normative patterns identified in the data set
involve the second category,260 the Council’s capacity to bind non-state
actors requires a more extensive discussion. The Council often
regulates non-state actors indirectly by obligating states to take action
against non-state groups and individuals.261 The clearest examples are
the various smart-sanctions regimes, which enlist national laws and
institutions to penalize individuals through travel bans, asset freezes,
and other measures under Chapter VII.262 One could well argue that
because these sanctions are triggered by and designed to reverse acts
of non-state entities, the indirect nature of the punitive measures is not
a meaningful distinction from direct measures. But the Council has
also addressed non-state actors directly without the mediating
presence of states.263 One example is secessionist entities, which the

259. See generally Maurizio Arcari, Limits to Security Council Powers Under UN the Charter
and Issues of Charter Interpretation, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 239, 239 (2012) (discussing
the varied approaches to interpreting the Council’s power and the worry that it is
extending beyond its permissible boundaries).
260. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
261. See COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER, supra note 258, at 800–01; see also Enrico
Carisch & Loraine Rickard-Martin, Implementation of United Nations Targeted Sanctions,
in TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS
150, 150 (Biersteker et al. eds., 2016) (arguing that while effective implementation rests
on states, U.N. bodies such as the Secretariat also have implementation responsibilities).
262. See Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen, Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed
Conflicts: First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda, 91 INT’L AFF. 1387, 1388 (2015)
(identifying twenty-seven Council-created sanctions regimes since the end of the Cold
War that “target individuals, groups, companies, regimes[,] and products, for example
by means of financial sanctions, travel bans, commodity trade restrictions and sectoral
economic means”). Another prominent example is resolutions requiring states to take
various actions against terrorist groups. Resolutions, SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTERTERRORISM COMMITTEE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (providing a list of the Council’s Counter-Terrorism resolutions).
See generally Boon, supra note 70, at 560–61 (examining the Sanctions Committees’
duties as investigators and decision makers determining when violations occurred and
which actors should be included in sanctions regimes).
263. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6–7 (2014) (noting that the Council
has called on non-state actors to respect human right obligations); Jan Klabbers, (I
Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC
COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354–
55 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (arguing that there must be a justification
for placing international obligations on non-state actors); Kooijmans, supra note 82, at
333; Pini Pavel Miretski, Delegitimizing or Evolving? The Legality of UN Security
Council Resolutions Imposing Duties on Non-State Actors 2 (Nov. 25, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19
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Council periodically addresses independently of their parent states.264
Another example is political candidates or parties who defy the results
of democratic elections.265 Of more relevance to this study, the
Council has frequently demanded that armed opposition groups
refrain from a variety of actions during or in the aftermath of NIACs,
such as breaching peace accords, violating human rights, or
transgressing humanitarian law.266 Cases where the Council has made
demands of armed opposition groups are wide-ranging and include
the former Yugoslavia,267 Cambodia,268 Afghanistan,269 the DR

63689 (stating that the Council has passed resolutions which create duties for nonstate actors).
264. See S.C. Res. 942, at 2 (Sept. 23, 1994) (imposing sanctions on “those areas of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces”);
S.C. Res. 216, ¶ 1 (Nov. 12, 1965) (condemning “the unilateral declaration of
independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia”); S.C. Res. 169, ¶¶ 1, 3
(Nov. 24, 1961) (addressing attempted Katangese secession from Congo, Council
insists “that such [secessionist] activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all
concerned to desist therefrom”); S.C. Res. 50, ¶ 1 (May 29, 1948) (addressing “all
Governments and authorities concerned” on question of Palestine).
265. See S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 1 (Mar. 30, 2011) (Côte d’Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1132, at 1 (Oct.
8, 1997) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 841, at 2 (June 16, 1993) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 804, at 2
(Jan. 29, 1993) (Angola).
266. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2113, at 4 (July 30, 2013) (condemning the human rights and
humanitarian law violations occurring in Sudan); S.C. Res. 2098, at 2 (Mar. 28, 2013)
(expressing concern over the transgressions of human rights and humanitarian law in
DR Congo); S.C. Res. 1964, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2010) (condemning human rights violations
occurring in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (demanding that all groups
in Sudan comply with their international human rights and humanitarian law
obligations); S.C. Res. 1577, at 2, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (considering appropriate measures
for armed organization responsible for human rights violations in Burundi); S.C. Res.
1509, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19, 2003) (demanding parties in Liberia fulfill their obligations under
the peace and ceasefire agreements).
267. S.C. Res. 752, ¶ 1 (May 15, 1992) (demanding “that all parties and others
concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, [and] respect
immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992”).
268. S.C. Res. 792, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 1992) (demanding “that the PDK fulfil immediately
its obligations under the Paris Agreements”).
269. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998) (demanding that “Afghan factions put an
end to discrimination against girls and women and other violations of human rights”).
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Congo,270 Angola,271 the Central African Republic,272 and Syria.273
Council demands for “parties” or “all parties” to NIACs to cease
unlawful acts or abjure violence have become almost routine.274 The
ICJ has all but acknowledged the Council’s authority to impose legal
obligations directly on non-state entities. In the Kosovo Advisory
Opinion, the ICJ observed that “it has not been uncommon for the
Security Council to make demands on actors other than U.N. member
270. S.C. Res. 1417, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2002) (reiterating that the Council “holds the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma, as the de facto authority,
responsible to bring to an end all extrajudicial executions, human rights violations[,]
and arbitrary harassment of civilians in Kisangani”).
271. S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 4 (July 15, 1993) (demanding that “UNITA accept
unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the
‘Acordos de Paz’”).
272. S.C. Res. 2121, ¶ 15 (Oct. 10, 2013) (demanding “that all armed groups, in
particular Seleka elements[,] prevent the recruitment and use of children”).
273. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning “the widespread violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as
the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed
groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as all grave
violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable
international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on
schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment[,] and
use as human shields”).
274. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2109, ¶ 14 (July 11, 2013) (demanding “that all parties
immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights violations and abuses against
the civilian population in South Sudan”); S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013)
(condemning a multitude of armed groups in the DR Congo and “all other armed
groups and their continuing violence and abuses of human rights”); S.C. Res. 1861,
¶ 20 (Jan. 14, 2009) (demanding all parties to conflicts in Chad and Central African
Republic cease hostilities); S.C. Res. 1553, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2004) (condemning “all acts of
violence,” and expressing “great concern” about continued violations of the
withdrawal line in Lebanon); S.C. Res. 925, ¶ 6 (June 8, 1994) (demanding “that all
parties to the conflict . . . agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an
end to systematic killings in areas under their control” in Rwanda). The Council has
also used such all-encompassing language to address non-state parties in its thematic
resolutions on particularly vulnerable groups in armed conflict. In Resolution 1894
on civilians in armed conflict, for example, the Council demanded that “parties to
armed conflict comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under
international humanitarian, human rights[,] and refugee law, as well as to implement
all relevant decisions of the Security Council.” S.C. Res. 1894, ¶ 1 (Nov. 11, 2009); see
also S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 1 (July 26, 2005) (condemning “the recruitment and use of child
soldiers by parties to armed conflict”); S.C. Res. 1502, at ¶ 3 (Aug. 26, 2003) (affirming
the “obligation of all parties involved in an armed conflict to comply fully with the
rules and principles of international law applicable to them related to the protection
of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel”);
S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 9 (Oct. 31, 2000) (providing similar obligations for “all parties”
regarding women in armed conflict).
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states and inter-governmental organizations.”275 Because the Court
found that the resolution at issue did not contain such demands, it had
no occasion to rule on their binding quality.276 But, the opinion
recognized “the possibility that non-state actors can be bound by
obligations demanded of them by the Security Council.”277
An increase in Council engagement with non-state actors appears
inevitable because most conflicts it now addresses are NIACs.278 Eightyseven percent (46/53) of the conflicts in the data set are NIACs.279 The
Council would quickly relegate itself to irrelevance if it was unable or
unwilling to address at least one of the parties to every NIAC. Take the
conflict in the DR Congo, where much of the country has lacked state
authority for almost two decades.280 In the eastern provinces where
fighting has been concentrated, “[m]ore than 30 illegal armed groups
operate . . . , fighting over territory, exploiting their natural
resources[,] and committing atrocity crimes against civilians.”281 When
the Council created a novel “intervention brigade” in March 2013 to
address this security vacuum, it listed seven armed groups by name and
demanded that they “cease immediately all forms of violence and

275. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 116 (July 22).
276. Id. ¶ 115.
277. Gleider I. Hernández, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of the International Court
of Justice, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 140,
145 (highlighting that the court did not close the door on Council placing binding
obligations on non-state actors); see Accordance with International Law of Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 117 (establishing that
the court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the Council intended to bind
state or non-state actors).
278. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (“[T]he practice of the Security Council is rich with cases of civil war or
internal strife which it classified as a ‘threat to the peace’ and dealt with under
Chapter VII . . . .”).
279. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
280. See KOEN VLASSENROOT, ARMED GROUPS AND MILITIAS IN EASTERN DR CONGO 3–
4 (2008), https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:610652/FULLTEXT01.pdf
(explaining that the government has been filled with private individuals seeking
economic gain since the 1990s).
281. Touko Piiparinen, Intervening to Strengthen Sovereignty: The Lessons of the UN
Intervention Brigade for Global Peacekeeping, 30 INT’L REL. 154, 157 (2016); see also U.N.
Secretary-General, Special Rep. on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Great Lakes Region, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. S/2013/119 (Feb. 27, 2013) (detailing the duties
of the intervention brigade which include dismantling armed groups and creating a
conducive environment for the return of a State authority).
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destabilizing activities and that their members immediately and
permanently disband and lay down their arms.”282
This felt need to address the realities of contemporary armed
conflict is surely the most obvious explanation for the Council
expanding its reach beyond state actors. Employing such a resultoriented pragmatism as a legal justification is appropriate for a body
given a deliberately open-ended mandate for the “maintenance of
international peace and security.”283 In the Reparations for Injuries
case,284 the ICJ relied heavily on such pragmatic justifications,
instructing that the powers of an international organization are to be
understood both by whether they are “necessitated by the discharge of
its functions” and how they have “developed in practice.”285
c.

Authority to intervene in internal matters such as NIACs

Third, the Council has the authority to intervene in states’ internal
affairs. Because states traditionally regarded NIACs as essentially
domestic affairs—struggles for political control within sovereign
282. S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013).
283. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1; see Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 32. Council history has
been marked by a series of innovative and adaptive measures, ranging from “all
necessary means” authorizations to national forces, to the vast expansion of its
jurisdiction, to peacekeeping, to targeted sanctions, to the creation of criminal
tribunals. This constant evolution is in keeping with the goal of the Charter’s drafters
“to reserve for the Security Council the maximum possible decision-making flexibility”
so that it could “respond to a theoretically unlimited range of possible threats at a time
and in a manner of its choosing.” Edward C. Luck, A Council for All Seasons: The Creation
of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 61, 62–63
(Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
284. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
285. Id. at 180. The Court later accorded an organization’s own determination that
certain powers were necessary to discharge its function as a presumption of legality.
Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20)
(“[W]hen [an] Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”). The ICTR Trial
Chamber invoked a similar pragmatism in rejecting a challenge to the Council’s ability
to create a court with criminal jurisdiction over individuals:
[T]he Security Council provided an important innovation of international
law, but there is nothing in the Defence Counsel’s motion to suggest that this
extension of the applicability of international law against individuals was not
justified or called for by the circumstances, notably the seriousness, the
magnitude[,] and the gravity of the crimes committed during the conflict.
Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 35 (July 18, 1997) (emphasis added).
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communities into which outsiders have no business intruding286—the
Council’s ability to overcome such claims of exclusive domestic
jurisdiction starkly distinguish its powers from that of states acting
unilaterally. Whereas international law prohibits individual states from
intervening in NIACs against the wishes of the incumbent government,
the Charter is now understood to authorize the Council to do so.287
The Council’s views on legal issues in NIACs thus result from a body of
practice in which individual states could not fully engage.288
d. The Council as agent for U.N. member states
The fourth attribute of Council authority that supports use of its
practice as evidence of customary law is its status as an agent for the
U.N. membership at large. The Council is frequently described as an
unrepresentative elite body that pursues policies at odds with the views
of some or many other U.N. member states.289 If true, this claim would
create a dilemma for our assessment of custom because the Council
would use its unique powers to speak authoritatively on issues of armed
conflict based on the views of a very small number of states. The claim
of Council unrepresentativeness requires an understanding of the
relation between Council resolutions and U.N. member states more
generally. This Article argues for a view that attributes Councilimposed obligations to the entire U.N. membership.

286. See Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed
Conflict:
Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence,
91 INT’L L. STUD. 60, 88 (2015) (discussing how States have been reluctant to use
international law as a method to regulate civil wars due to a reluctance to grant any
legitimacy to the non-state armed organizations).
287. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” (emphasis added)), with Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 246 (June 27) (noting I.C.J.’s argument that the principle of nonintervention in international law would be destroyed if the opposition to the state’s
government could also request international intervention).
288. Council and state practice would overlap where incumbent governments
consent to external involvement.
289. See Barbara Crossette, At the U.N., a Drive for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/24/world/at-the-un-a-drive-fordiversity.html.
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2.

The Council’s relation to U.N. member states
Three approaches to Council-imposed obligations are possible:
(i) as autonomous acts of the organization; (ii) as acts of Council
member states individually; or (iii) as acts of the organization as an
agent of its member states. The first view fully disengages Council
resolutions from member states and considers the states as separate
legal entities. While such a view may accurately describe other
international organizations, it is inconsistent with the Charter’s
description of the Council as an agent for member states.290 The
second and opposite approach would view Council resolutions as the
individual practice of its fifteen voting states, five of which are
290. This approach found little support in the ILC, however. “[W]hat matters”
about resolutions of international organization organs, the Commission stated in
commentary, “is that they may reflect the collective expression of the views of States
members of such organs.” ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 107
(emphasis added); see Odermatt, supra note 231, at 493 (the ILC “sees States as the
driving force in international law-making, and the capacity of international
organizations to contribute to the development of international law is reduced to their
role in expressing the will of States”).
The Commission describes one instance in which an international organization
would act wholly on its own legal authority: “where member States have transferred
exclusive competences to the international organization.” ILC Draft Conclusions on
Custom, supra note 5, at 89. The Commission gives the European Union as the sole
example of such a transfer. Id.; see also Wood, Third Report, supra note 5, at 53
(referencing only the EU as an example of an international organization with exclusive
competentences). While the ILC does not elaborate on the nature of “exclusive
competences,” it appears to describe a state fully abrogating its capacity to act in a
particular area of international relations. As an EU representative told the GA’s Sixth
Committee, “in areas where, according to the rules of the EU Treaties, only the Union
can act it is the practice of the Union that should be taken into account with regard to
the formation of customary international law.” EU Statement—United Nation 6th
Commission: Identification of Customary International Law, EUR. UNION DELEGATION TO
UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 3, 2014), http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nation6th-commission-identification-of-customary-international-law; see Wood, Third Report,
supra note 5, at 53 n.184 (referencing this statement favorably).
The Security Council certainly does not enjoy exclusive competence in the sense
that member states have ceded to it all their capacity to act in specific areas, but one
could argue that states have given the Council exclusive authority in a narrower sense:
by agreeing to abide by its decisions on specific conflicts. These decisions are not, as
in the case of the EU, confined to discrete areas of policy-making. The Council’s broad
mandate to maintain international peace and security is virtually open-ended. But
once the Council has taken a decision within its competence, member states do not
retain the ability to act contrary to its dictates.
The Council can thus be understood as possessing an exclusive competence when
it displaces states’ freedom of action in specific instances. In those cases, Council
resolutions could generate evidence of custom on its own behalf assuming the
resolutions otherwise embody sufficient practice and opinion juris.
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permanent members and ten of which are non-permanent
members.291 From 1990 to 2013, ninety-five states have been members
of the Security Council, representing significant state practice if one
were to remove the Council entirely from the picture.292 While this
approach hews most closely to the traditionally state-centric nature of
customary law, it does not account for the unique institutional setting
in which the votes take place: within a body of power that substantially
exceeds that of states acting unilaterally.293 Moreover, Council action
has significance for custom precisely because its interventions in
NIACs now substantially exceed those of individual states.294 Any
theory of the resolutions’ provenance must consider states’ evident
choice of the Council as their primary vehicle for addressing NIACs.
3.

Agency theory
This leaves the third approach to Council-imposed obligations:
agency theory. Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that member
states “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts
on their behalf.”295 We understand Article 24 to create an agency
relationship between member states and the Council: “members, who
have ‘delegated’ parts of their sovereignty, remain the source of
authority of the Council [meaning] that the States, being the trust
givers, are in consequence also the principals.”296 Under this view,

291. See Current Members, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/
members (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
292. See Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL,
https://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing all
countries elected to the Council at least once since 1946).
293. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The data set did not tabulate votes on
Security Council resolutions, which might count against state practice if a member
voted against a particular resolution.
294. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
295. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
296. COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER, supra note 258, at 775 (summarizing agency
theory argument). Compare id. at 776 (arguing that the language of the Charter
highlights that the Council is supposed to act in the best interest of all members, but
the acts are imputable to the entire organization), and HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 280 (1950)
(arguing that the Council acts not on behalf of the members, but on behalf of the
entire United Nations), with Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 544 n.61 (1993) (noting that the Council’s authority illustrates
the members’ willingness to delegate authority).
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Council practice is ultimately the practice of member states.297 While
the ICJ has only hinted at support of the agency theory,298 some
member states made the agency argument directly early in U.N.
history.299 More recently, many non-permanent members have cited
Article 24(1) in calling for greater transparency in Council
procedures, arguing that if the Council acts on their behalf they should
have greater input into its deliberations.300 Their claim, in essence, is
297. See BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 182 (2010) (finding Council “actions provide some evidence
of the views of U.N. member states—Council members directly, and all members
indirectly”).
298. In its 1971 Namibia decision, the Court seemed to side with the agency view
but did not pronounce squarely on the question:
It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once such a
declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the
Charter, on behalf of all member States, those Members would be free to act
in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting
from it. When confronted with such an internationally unlawful situation,
Members of the United Nations would be expected to act in consequence of
the declaration made on their behalf.
Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 112 (June 21) (emphasis added).
299. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 472nd mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.472 (May 24, 1950)
(statement of Ecuador) (noting that “it must be remembered that every member of
the Council, under the Charter, acts not only as a representative of his country, but as
a representative of all States Members of the United Nations. That particular
responsibility is assumed by all members of the Council”); U.N. SCOR, 310th mtg. at
24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.310 (May 29, 1948) (statement of Syria) (stating that “each
representative on the Security Council has two duties: one is to represent and present
the views of his Government; the other is to represent the fifty-eight Members of the
United Nations and to speak on their behalf. Article 24 of the Charter states that the
Security Council should act on behalf of all the Member States”); U.N. SCOR, 59th
mtg. at 176, U.N. Doc. S/PV.59 (Sept. 3, 1946) (statement of United States)
(approving the view that “the Security Council does not represent individually only the
States which have representatives on the Council, but represents all fifty-one United
Nations. It is their agent for carrying out the purposes of the Charter, and such
directions as the United Nations may give it under the Charter”); U.N. SCOR, 40th
mtg. at 249, U.N. Doc. S/PV.40 (May 8, 1946) (statement of Australia) (“Our
interpretation of the Charter is that each member of this Council, whether permanent
or non-permanent, acts in a representative capacity that extends beyond the
representation of his own Government. He is acting on behalf of all the Members of
the United Nations.”).
300. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 7539th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7539 (Oct. 20, 2015)
(statement of Niger) (stating that Article 24 clearly requires the Council to act for all
Members); U.N. SCOR, 7285th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7285 (Oct. 23, 2014)
(statement of St. Lucia) (arguing that all Members have an equal stake the Council’s
functions because it acts on behalf of all Members); U.N. SCOR 7052nd, mtg. at 27–
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that, as principals, they must be able to communicate their views to
their agent fully and effectively.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone relied on the agency theory in
rejecting Liberian President Charles Taylor’s claim for Head-of-State
immunity.301 The question in the Taylor case was whether the Special
Court constituted one of the “international tribunals” to which the ICJ
had referred in the Arrest Warrant case as capable prosecuting heads of
state unconstrained by immunity doctrines.302 In deciding that it was
such an international tribunal, the Special Court focused on the
agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations establishing
the Court and on the Security Council’s authorization for that
agreement in Resolution 1315.303
It is to be observed that in carrying out its duties under its
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the
United Nations. The Agreement between the United Nations and
Sierra Leone is thus an agreement between all members of the
United Nations and Sierra Leone. This fact makes the agreement
an expression of the will of the international community. The
Special Court established in such circumstances is truly
international.304

In addition, the agency theory better embodies the logic of the
Charter’s collective security system. The Charter famously discarded
international law’s traditional view of armed conflict as solely the
concern of the warring parties, insisting that all member states share

28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7052 (Oct. 29, 2013) (statement of Egypt) (noting that the
Council’s methods are the collective responsibility of the all Members because Article
24 indicates the Council acts on behalf of the entire membership); U.N. SCOR, 6300th
mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6300 (Apr. 22, 2010) (statement of Lebanon) (promoting
an increase in open door meetings to promote transparency as Article 24 the Council
represents all members); U.N. SCOR, 3611st mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3611 (Dec.
20, 1995) (statement of Algeria) (declaring that the Council’s acts must have
additional legitimacy because the Council acts for all Member States).
301. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 20 (May 31, 2004).
302. Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 37
(Feb. 2002).
303. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2001-01-I, ¶ 35. The resolution authorized the
Secretary-General to “negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone
to create an independent special court consistent with this resolution.” S.C. Res. 1315,
¶ 1 (Aug. 14, 2000).
304. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2001-01-I, ¶ 38 (citation omitted). The Court cited
Article 24, paragraph one, of the Charter as support for the proposition in the first
sentence of this passage. Id. ¶ 38 n.31.
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an interest in maintaining the peace.305 The agency theory ensures
that the official positions of member states on conflicts do not diverge
from executive decisions of the Council on the same conflicts by
making the two legally indistinguishable.
Under the agency theory, Council resolutions would not only
acquire the universality critical to General Assembly resolutions’
customary status, but would effectively become state practice—the
most traditional source of custom. Assuming the agency theory is
correct, is it sufficient to demonstrate member states’ consent to
Council actions relevant to custom? There are at least two reasons one
might answer in the negative. First, Article 24(1) is a legal fiction, as
the Council’s small size and political composition make it in reality
quite unrepresentative of the broader membership. Second, the veto
ensures that interests of the P5 can take precedence over the interests
of other member states on whose behalf the Council purportedly acts.
Neither of these responses is persuasive. First, the claim that
aggregated Council norms uniquely rely on a fictitious consent is simply
incorrect. The traditional view of customary international law is rife
with legal fictions. For instance, states that remain silent during the
gestation of a customary norm are usually deemed to have consented
to its emergence.306 And each act forming relevant state practice is
deemed to have been undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation
before that obligation crystalized into a binding norm.307 Indeed, one
might well view the entire enterprise of discerning an actual consensus
among states to be grounded in fiction.308 A fiction of member state
consent to aggregated Council norms is thus hardly unique.

305. See NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & NIGEL D. WHITE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THEORY,
LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (2013) (contending that security is the public good enjoyed by
all members of the organization).
306. SHAW, supra note 198, at 63–65; Charney, supra note 296, at 538 (arguing that
it may be advantageous to engage with the legal fiction that countries who fail to object
to the making of customary law have consented since customary law is traditionally
created by a few states).
307. See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544 (2005) (questioning whether customary international law
“can . . . ever come into existence if it requires opinio juris—a sense of legal
obligation—before it can exist”).
308. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449, 474 (2000) (“[M]ost nations of the world lack the information, awareness,
resources or inclination to fully participate in a customary law process based on
presumed acceptance or consent. Since these theories rely on the acts of a few, they
define away the normative conviction of states, the element essential to establish the
authority of custom, thereby reducing it to a fiction.”).
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An additional reason to be skeptical of the unrepresentativeness
claim as support for the view that aggregated Council norms uniquely
create a legal fiction is that states directly involved in conflicts often
give actual consent to identified norms, and it is therefore incorrect to
describe consent to Council norms as wholly constructed or fictitious.
Many of the norms originate in peace agreements negotiated with
states undergoing or just concluding NIACs. These agreements often
contain detailed plans for post-conflict reconstruction initiatives to be
overseen by a peacekeeping mission approved by the Council.309 Many
tasks respond to aspects of the NIAC addressed when the conflict was
active. If the Council condemned the use of child soldiers, for
example, peace agreements might contain provisions for their
decommissioning and rehabilitation.310
The agreements also
frequently request that the United Nations create a peacekeeping
mission to oversee their implementation.311 Those oversight tasks are
then incorporated into the mandate of the peacekeeping mission,
which is approved by the Council.312 The multiple opportunities for
these “specially affected” state and non-state actors to reject norms

309. See Michael Tiernay, Which Comes First? Unpacking the Relationship Between Peace
Agreements and Peacekeeping Missions, 32 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 135, 137 (2015)
(explaining that parties sign peace agreements because a peace-keeping mission has
been, or will be, deployed in that state); see also Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 116, at
975 (detailing how Council Resolution 1325 suggested incorporating women in peace
agreements and peace-keeping missions).
310. See Darfur Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan Liberation Movement/ArmyJustice and Equality Movement, art. 29, ¶ 430, May 5, 2006,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_050505_DarfurPeace
Agreement.pdf (containing a provision for the disarmament and demobilization of
child soldiers); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 19 (July 30, 2010) (encouraging all parties to work
with the Secretary General to develop a plan to end recruitment of child soldiers); see
also SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, CROSS-CUTTING REPORT: CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT 4
(2015),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/cross_cutting_report_2_children_and_armed_conflict_
2015.pdf (discussing Council Resolution 2143, which speaks generally to the
protection of children, preventing underage recruitment of child soldiers, and
supporting the “Children, Not Soldiers” campaign).
311. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, § 8.6.5, Jan. 9, 2005
(requesting the support of the U.N.’s Peace Support Mission in implementing demining efforts).
312. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 4(c) (Mar. 24, 2005) (granting the U.N.’s Mission in
Sudan the authority to assist with de-mining efforts as requested in the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement).
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embedded in resolutions moves their approval well beyond the realm
of fictional consent.313
The second claim that veto power ensures the interests of the P5 over
those of the other members epitomizes the charge that the Council is
a politically elite body primarily responsive to the interests of the P5.
But this overstates the veto’s role. In the period covered by our data,
thirty-three vetoes were cast with twenty-one of those addressing only
two conflicts: Israel-Palestine and Syria.314 During the same period,
the Council passed 1485 resolutions.315 Vetoes thus account for only
0.021% of resolutions put to a vote. More importantly, there is little
evidence that the reasons for the vetoes had any relation to normative
obligations otherwise routinely imposed by the Council.
4.

Delegating authority to act but not to contribute to customary law
Even if one accepts a theory of Council agency, it is not clear that
the delegation to act on member states’ behalf includes the ability to
contribute to the development of custom. There is an argument that
the former does not necessarily include the latter. Article 24 itself is
obviously silent on this question. The most straightforward answer is
that such a delegation to the Council would simply retain the link
between acts and normatively relevant evidence that exists for state
practice. Evidence of practice is understood to inhere in state actions
made legally consequential by opinio juris; the two cannot be
disaggregated.316 For member states to authorize the Council to act on
their behalf but withhold normative consequences of that action would
consign the “acts concerned” to a legal black hole: U.N. member states
would not be acting in their own capacities, and thus no “state practice”
would be created, but, with normative consequences withheld, the
Council’s corporate acts would make no contribution to customary

313. This is obviously not the only context in which the Council creates obligations
in NIACs, but it is a common one.
314. See UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. For a list of all vetoed Security
Council resolutions, see Security Council-Veto List, UNITED NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto (last updated Jan. 8, 2018). The
states and conflicts addressed by vetoed resolutions were Nicaragua (1), IsraelPalestine (15), Cyprus (2), Bosnia (3), Guatemala (1), Macedonia (1), Myanmar (1),
Zimbabwe (1), Georgia (1), Syria (6), and Ukraine (2).
315. The first resolution of 1990 was number 647; the last resolution of 2013 was
number 2132.
316. In the ICJ’s phrasing, for purposes of custom, “the acts concerned” must “amount
to a settled practice.” North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added).
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law. As a result, no actor could claim as its own the potentially significant
contributions to custom represented by the data set.317
5.

Conclusions
The Charter places the Council at the center of its collective security
scheme, endowing it with powers not available to member states acting
unilaterally. To accept the Council’s exceptional authority in NIACs
but withhold any normative consequences of that authority would
make little sense, since then no international actor would take
ownership of this important body of practice.
C.

Frequency and Consistency of Council Practice

The Council’s role as preeminent legal regulator of armed conflict
is the first component of the argument for treating its practice in
NIACs as evidence of custom. The second component is the practice
itself, some of which was examined in review of the four contested
issues of customary law the Council has addressed.318 The data also
lend themselves to the broader question of whether the Council has
largely fulfilled or abdicated its leadership role set out in the Charter
system.319 If the Council either failed to respond to the most destructive
NIACs or addressed the legal issues those conflicts raise in an ad hoc or
unsystematic manner, one might conclude that Council practice has
little to add to customary law. The data suggest this is not the case.320
This Section shows that the Council has been omnipresent in
contemporary NIACs and consistently imposed similar obligations
across those NIACs.
The claim for Council relevance to custom does not depend on
Council imposing these same obligations in every NIAC going forward.
That is, this Article does not argue the Council will consistently
displace otherwise applicable norms by legislative fiat. The Council’s
relevance emanates rather from a demonstrated commitment to the
same norms of conduct in the NIACs in which it has intervened. That
the Council has not imposed obligations in every NIAC is also not a
critique of this Article’s claim. As long as the reasons for its non317. The argument here is complex. If Council acts do count as evidence of custom
they would, under the agency theory, ultimately be attributed to the Council’s
principals: the member states. But absent an agency theory, the normative value of
Council acts would be attributed neither to member states acting in their own
capacities nor imputed to member states via their agent.
318. See supra notes 53–181 and accompanying text.
319. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
320. Id.
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engagement in a particular conflict are unrelated to the norms
imposed in the vast majority of NIACs in which it does engage, the
Council’s absence from a few conflicts does not make its normative
patterns less relevant as evidence of law.
Similarly, consistently imposed obligations are not marginalized just
because the Council does not impose the same obligations in each and
every NIAC it addresses Different NIACs present different challenges
to the Council. To take an example discussed above, parties in some
NIACs mostly adhere to peace agreements while parties in others
violate them regularly.321 Although the Council does not oblige parties
to adhere to such agreements in NIACs in which they are already being
obeyed, this is not an example of inconsistent practice. It is simply
responding to the circumstances of each conflict as needed.
1.

Frequent Council involvement in contemporary NIACs
The Council dramatically increased its response to NIACs after the
end of the Cold War, both quantitatively—by passing resolutions on
more conflicts—and qualitatively—by engaging in a substantially
broader range of activities, particularly post-conflict.322 The data show
that the Council passed at least one resolution on 76% (35/46) of all
NIACs from 1990 to 2013 that fit the inclusion criteria.323 The figure
is slightly higher—80% (12/15)—for NIACs that began after 1990,
with only the conflicts in the Republic of the Congo, Algeria, and
Nigeria receiving no resolutions.324 While it is difficult to identify with
certainty the causes for Council abstention from the Republic of the

321. See supra notes 129–43 and accompanying text.
322. See infra Table 3; see also DOYLE & SAMBANIS, supra note 151, at 6 (describing the
increase in Council activity between 1987 and 1994); Einsiedel et al., supra note 67, at
5–8 (acknowledging the increase of Council actions after the end of the Cold War due,
in part, to the cooperation of the permanent Council members); ROBERTS & ZAUM,
supra note 2, at 52–58 (noting the increase in the number of peacekeeping missions,
the increase of post-conflict international administrations, the shift towards a broad
definition of the Council’s authority under the Charter, and the creation of
international tribunals).
323. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
324. Id.
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Congo,325 Algeria,326 and Nigeria327 conflicts, inaction does not appear
to have stemmed from a reluctance to pronounce on normative issues

325. The Republic of the Congo involved a multiplicity of reasons for inaction:
conditions on the ground unfavorable to external intervention, deference to regional
mediation efforts, and rapid changes in the conflict dynamic. See Uppsala Conflict
Data Program, Congo: Government, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://ucdp.uu.se/#/
conflict/408 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). In August 1997, the Council began
peacekeeping preparations after the Organization of African Unity appealed to the
Council to send a peacekeeping mission, echoing an earlier request from the President
of the Congo. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Situation in the Republic of the Congo,
¶¶ 17–18, U.N. Doc. S/1997/814 (Oct. 21, 1997). However, in mid-October of that
year, the fragile government of President Pascal Lissouba fell to the forces of Denis
Sassou-Nguessou, assisted by troops from Chad and Angola. Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, supra. In late October 1997, the Secretary-General reported that the Council
had set three conditions for dispatching a force: “(a) adherence to an agreed
ceasefire; (b) agreement to international control of the Brazzaville airport; and (c) a
commitment by the parties to a negotiated settlement covering all political and
military aspects of the crisis.” U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Situation in the
Republic of the Congo, supra, ¶ 3. He reported further that “[t]he Council took the view
that, despite some positive political developments, those conditions had not yet been
fulfilled and called upon the parties to fulfil them without delay.” Id. Reporting to the
Council on October 21, 1997, the Secretary-General acknowledged that this (at least shortterm) victory meant plans for a U.N. mission could not go forward. Id. ¶ 44.
326. The reasons for abstention from Algeria appear to be a combination of some
Council members supporting the government in its conflict with Islamist rebels and
the government’s strong resistance to any external involvement for the first six years
of the conflict. The Algerian conflict began after the military cancelled the second
round of elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front in December 1991. Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, Algeria:
Government, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET,
http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/386 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). Both France, the former
colonial power, and the United States supported the regime in its subsequent civil war.
ANDREW J. PIERRE & WILLIAM J. QUANDT, THE ALGERIAN CRISIS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE
WEST 52 (1996). But resistance from the Algerian parties to any reconciliation efforts
played no small role in the lack of external involvement. Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl,
Algeria (1992–Present), in 1 CIVIL WARS OF THE WORLD: MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD
WAR II 103, 117 (Karl Derouen, Jr. & Uk Heo eds., 2007); Gorm Rye Olson, Europe and
the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How Serious Is Europe and for What
Reason?, 97 AFRICAN AFF. 343, 363 (1998).
327. One could argue that the Nigeria/Boko Haram conflict was effectively
addressed by a Council resolution. In May 2014, the Council’s Al Qaeda sanctions
committee took the significant step of adding Boko Harm to its sanctions list, citing
reasons that echo its broader normative agenda for NIACs. See Narrative Summaries of
Reasons for Listing, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (May 22, 2014), https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jama%27atu-ahlissunna-lidda%27awati-wal-jihad-%28boko (citing numerous acts of terror including
attacks on Nigerian schools and students as the reasons for listing Boko Haram).
Because the sanctions committee is composed of Council members, the committee’s
condemnation of Boko Haram is effectively a condemnation by the Council. See
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the Council addresses regularly in other conflicts. Indeed, in two of
the three conflicts—in the Republic of the Congo and Nigeria—the
Council issued Presidential statements that echoed normative
positions taken in other NIACs.328
In addition to addressing more conflicts since 1990, the Council also
began regularly invoking Chapter VII and deploying peacekeeping
missions. The Council issued Chapter VII resolutions in 48%, (22/46)
of all NIACs from 1990 to 2014, and where the Council passed at least
one resolution for a NIAC, it invoked Chapter VII in 63% of those cases
(22/35).329 Of the seventy missions authorized by the Council since
1948, fifty-three (76%) were authorized after 1990, and fifty-eight
(83%) were authorized after 1988.330 This represents an increase in
propensity to use the most important legal authority and the most
interventionist tool available to the Council, from an average of 0.35
missions authorized per year prior to 1990 to an average of 2.21 after
1990.331

Security Council Subsidiary Bodies:
An Overview, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL,
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
328. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Terrorist Attacks by Boko Haram, U.N. Press Release SC/12233-AFR/3319 (Feb. 2,
2016) (condemning the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Dalori village in Nigeria
on January 30, 2016); S.C. Pres. Statement 2015/4 (Jan. 19, 2015) (denouncing the
actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon); U.N. SCOR, 7421st mtg. at
2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7421 (Mar. 30, 2015) (addressing the Boko Haram attacks in
Nigeria and appealing for international support of the humanitarian crises caused by
the attacks); S.C. Pres. Statement 1997/47 (Oct. 16, 1997) (calling for a halt to the
violence and respect for the civilian population in Republic of the Congo); S.C. Pres.
Statement 1997/43 (Aug. 13, 1997) (advocating for a halt to the violence in the
Republic of the Congo and for adherence to a previously negotiated ceasefire
agreement).
329. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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Table 3: Frequency and Nature of Council Involvement in NIACs
87%

% of Conflicts that are NIACs

% of NIACs with at Least One Council Resolution

% of NIACs Assigned a Peacekeeping
Mission
% of NIACs with Chapter VII

76%

57%

48%

% of Chapter VII NIACs with Sanctions Imposed

73%

The implications of the Council having addressed virtually all
contemporary NIACs are two-fold. First, this negates the claim that the
Council’s normative preferences are specific to particular conflicts,
regions, or even time periods of the post-Cold War era. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, this reaffirms the Council’s central role in
the international community’s response to NIACs. The Council’s
omnipresence stands in contrast to a much lower level of state
involvement in the same NIACs. The Council has generally not
intervened in NIACs alongside individual states or regional
organizations but has done so in lieu of intervention on their part.332
Few states either have the capacity to intervene effectively in NIACs or
view intervention as furthering their national interests.333 Non-Council
interventions from 1990 to 2013 were generally limited to a small

332. See supra note 3 (finding that individual states or groups of states only
intervened in 31% of the same conflicts in which the Council took action).
333. See Sumon Dantiki, Organizing for Peace: Collective Action Problems and
Humanitarian Intervention, J. MILITARY. & STRATEGIC STUD., Winter 2004, at 1, 3–6
(proposing that the lack of technological capabilities and the failure to view
humanitarian crises as a direct threat to states’ interests create obstacles to collective
humanitarian interventions).
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group of states.334 Few states intervened in any conflict, and fewer
intervened in multiple conflicts. The states that did intervene were
largely (1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states
intervening in just a handful of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
former Yugoslavia); (2) former colonial powers; or (3) regional powers
intervening in neighboring conflicts.335 Indeed, the data show that
every non-U.S. intervention was carried out by a neighbor or a former
colonial power.336 By contrast, the Council is unique in both its
consistency of action and breadth of activity. Whereas the Council
addressed 76% of all conflicts coded, third-party interventions in
conflicts account for just 31% of our cases.337 Taking account of
Council practice thus creates parity with member states’ apparent
delegation to the Council of their individual capacities to intervene in
NIACs regularly or systematically.
2.

Consistent imposition of similar obligations
The second element is the Council’s consistent imposition of similar
obligations across the NIACs with which it has engaged. A sampling of
issues338 gives a sense of the Council’s consistent use of the same
normative tools across conflicts. In NIACs in which the Council
invoked Chapter VII, it imposed the following obligations in the
frequency indicated: human rights violations condemned (64% of
conflicts), cessation of hostilities required (88%), adherence to peace
agreements required (83%), compliance with IHL obligations
mandated (82%), cessation of violations of international criminal law
required (50%), freedom of movement mandatorily granted to U.N.
personnel by non-state actors (82%), and sanctions imposed (73%).339
In addition, the Council authorized peacekeeping missions with

334. See supra note 1 (explaining that the data cited on this proposition is taken
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program). See generally, Erik Melander et al., Organized
Violence, 1989–2015, 53 J. PEACE RES. 727, 727–28 (2016) (analyzing state-based armed
conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided conflicts from 1989 to 2015).
335. The non-NATO interventions during the period included Ethiopia’s
intervention in Somalia, multiple neighbors and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone,
France and Rwanda in DR Congo, Russia and Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, and similar
interventions by neighbors in Azerbaijan, Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan. ECOWAS
intervened in West African conflicts, and other temporary coalitions led by France
intervened in Africa.
336. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
337. Id.
338. See supra Section III.B (discussing the use of Council-imposed obligations in
different NIACs).
339. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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mandates to create or enhance democratic institutions (63%), protect
human rights (82%), enhance the rule of law (65%), protect U.N.
personnel and installations (82%), and support transformation of
national institutions (71%).340
D.

Elements of Customary Law in Council Practice

Customary law consists of practice and opinio juris—the “belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.”341 This Section will argue that the Council practice
evidenced by the data set reflects these two traditional elements.
1.

Practice
One of the most common criticisms of viewing international
organization resolutions as evidence of custom is that they are
statements divorced from action: though often articulating specific
legal obligations, they lack the accompanying act or omission that
opinio juris designates as legally relevant. But binding Council
resolutions are not mere verbiage; they are themselves actions that
create new legal obligations and on occasion impose punitive measures
for non-compliance.342 In this sense they are similar to domestic
legislation, a frequently-invoked source of state practice.343 But many
resolutions in the data set go farther than imposing obligations to
authorize action by peacekeepers or national forces. In total, the
Council established fifty-three peacekeeping missions during the data
set period.344 The missions’ mandates initiated a series of acts on the
ground by U.N. personnel.345 The Special Representative of the
Secretary-General appointed for each mission reports regularly to the
Council on progress and challenges, creating a feedback loop by which
the Council adapts its mandate to new circumstances on the ground.346
340. Id.
341. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
342. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 (noting that states consider the Council’s
resolutions regarding terrorism as binding resolutions strengthened by the possibility
of enforcement for non-compliance).
343. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 77 (including state
“legislative and administrative acts” as forms of practice relevant to custom”).
344. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
345. See Connie Peck, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, in THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 67, at 457, 470 (illustrating
how an individual peacekeeping mission brings additional influences, including
supervision by the peacekeeping troops and other U.N. monitors).
346. Id. at 458–59.
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These two types of resolutions—those only imposing obligations and
those authorizing action to enforce the obligations—should not be
considered distinct for purposes of identifying relevant Council
practice. Rather, they should be interpreted as a continuum
constituting all relevant practice. When the Council seeks to bring
about an objective it typically begins with a non-binding exhortation,
then moves to a binding decision, and then, if necessary, to compelling
compliance.347 If a binding decision alone is sufficient to achieve
compliance, then the Council has no need to authorize action.348 Its
failure to act in such circumstances evidences no less commitment to
the legal obligations previously imposed than if the target of the
obligations had resisted, making compliance measures necessary.349
National legislation is not disqualified as evidence of state practice
because it is obeyed in most or all cases, necessitating no enforcement
action by state authorities.350 The same view should apply to Security
Council resolutions: success in producing compliance should not
militate against resolutions counting as evidence of custom.
Finally, two factors prominent in the ILC’s assessment of state
practice are also relevant to the Council. The first is the context in
which evidence arises.351 The Council has been involved in virtually
every contemporary NIAC and it regularly addresses the most
contentious legal issues arising from those conflicts.352 There is no
international body with greater involvement in NIACs and certainly

347. E.g., S.C. Res. 2266, ¶ 2 (Feb. 24, 2016) (deciding to renew the imposition of
sanctions on Yemen until it complied with U.N. Resolutions and returned to peaceful,
political transition); S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 1 (Apr. 14, 2015) (demanding a return to
democratic political transition and an immediate cease to the use of force by Houthis);
S.C. Res. 2201, ¶¶ 1–2 (Feb. 15, 2015) (deploring the Houthi dissolution of
government and takeover of Yemeni government institutions and reiterating the need
for resolution of differences through dialogue).
348. See D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Govt Wants to Review Ban on Tamil Diaspora Organizations Listed
as “Terrorists,” DAILY MIRROR (June 26, 2015), http://www.dailymirror.lk/77795/govtwants-to-review-ban-on-tamil-diaspora-organizations-listed-as-terrorists (describing Sri
Lanka’s willing compliance with binding Council Resolution 1373 by designating
sixteen organizations as terrorist fronts and freezing the organizations’ assets and
economic resources).
349. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1–2 (Sept. 28, 2001) (deciding that States shall prevent
the financing of terrorists and terroristic acts by cutting off financial assets and denying
safe haven for any individual involved in terrorism).
350. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 91 (including a state’s
legislative acts as a form of recognized state practice).
351. Id. at 84.
352. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (describing the extent of the
Council’s involvement in NIACs).
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none with the authority and propensity to bind parties to legal
obligations.353 Council resolutions should be accorded particular
significance based on this unique role. Second, the ILC has instructed
that practice of international actors is to be assessed “as a whole.”354
For the Council, this means taking account not just of individual
resolutions or conflicts but of the Council’s approach to a legal issue
across the entire range of conflicts with which it engages. This is
precisely the contribution of the aggregated data.355
Opinio juris
The nature of evidence needed to demonstrate opinio juris is
contested: the ILC insists opinio juris cannot be inferred from the mere
existence of practice, while commentators note an ICJ trend of
inferring opinio juris from a general practice.356 If one takes the latter
view then the data would itself be sufficient, since the obligations
identified are repeated in resolutions across a wide spectrum of time,
geography, and intensity of conflict.357 If one accepts the ILC view that
separate evidence is required, the evidence may be found in three
places. First, the Council itself recognizes that its resolutions may
affect custom. The many resolutions disclaiming any precedential
value in authorizing pursuit of pirates in Somali territorial waters are
the prime example.358 Second, the coded resolutions often make
specific reference to the legal context of the obligations, referring to
2.

353. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (noting that the Council intervenes
in NIACs at more than twice the rate of individual states or groups of states and does
so in a far broader range of conflicts).
354. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 92.
355. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
356. Compare ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 84 (requiring the
elements of a general practice and opinio juris to be addressed individually with
separate evidence), with CRAWFORD, supra note 236, at 26 (noting that the ICJ often
infers the element of opinio juris from evidence of a general practice). See generally
Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 148 (1987) (observing
that scholars have long believed that the existence of an opinio juris can be inferred
from a state’s consistent practice when there is little or no support against the existence
of an opinio juris).
357. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
358. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012) (“Affirms that the authorizations
renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall
not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under
international law, including any rights or obligations, under the Convention, with
respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall
not be considered as establishing customary international law . . . .”); see also supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
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applicable IHL, human rights law, or the possibility of criminal
accountability.359 The Tadić court found such references significant in
the resolutions it cited in support of a customary norm.360 In these
resolutions, in other words, the Council was not simply employing
pragmatic conflict-resolution tools devoid of international legal value
but was specifically invoking international law in order to bolster the
legitimacy of the obligations it imposed.361 Third, regardless of
whether the resolutions fit a pre-existing paradigm of opinio juris, they
have already been cited as constitutive of custom by six different
international courts.362 In those opinions, the resolutions were
“accepted as law.”363
More broadly, characterizing these obligations as conflict-specific
takes an unduly narrow view of how the Council approaches NIACs.
The Council does not start anew for each conflict, but rather
consistently uses the same obligations across a diverse array of
NIACs.364 These obligations do not each represent ad hoc political
compromises, as suggested by reference to the Council as an essentially
“political” body. For example, the Council imposed binding or
potentially binding obligations on non-state actors to respect human
rights in seventy-six separate resolutions in the data set, obligated those
actors to adhere to peace agreements in 202 resolutions, and required
free and fair elections in post-conflict states in thirty resolutions.365
The data set demonstrates that the Council hardly considered these
standards as one-off initiatives applicable only to single conflicts.
Finally, there is an air of formalistic unreality in applying a strict view
of opinio juris to Council resolutions. Social science literature has long
demonstrated that international institutions such as the Council play a
critical role in the definition and diffusion of norms.366 Norms

359. See S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 8–9 (Mar. 26, 1993); S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 10 (Dec. 3, 1992).
360. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
361. See supra note 359.
362. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
363. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1(b) (requiring the ICJ
to apply international custom as evidence of an opinio juris); see also 1 HUGH THIRLWAY,
THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 182 (2013).
364. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
365. Id.
366. See Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 237 (1985) (demonstrating that having
international regimes against which to measure actions is beneficial as these regimes
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frequently migrate well beyond their initial application, and
international organizations facilitate the process.367 Institutions
provide venues for socialization368 and states use international
institutions to communicate information about norms, goals, and
intentions.369 They employ institutions to self-bind in order to lock in
commitments.370 Institution-based efforts to signal participation in
norms can lead to lasting changes in behavior.371
These pathways to norm diffusion are hardly lost on Council
members. Professor Alexander Thompson, who focuses on the politics
on international organizations, argues that powerful states channel
coercive strategies through international organizations like the
Council.372 His argument demonstrates that the intent of members
“provide information about actors’ compliance; they facilitate the development and
maintenance of reputations; they can be incorporated into actors’ rules of thumb for
responding to others’ actions; and they may even apportion responsibility for
decentralized enforcement of rules”). Security Council action can also be seen as a
form of contested multilateralism—the process by which states, unsatisfied with the
ability to create norms through normal channels, can use alternative means to create
new regimes. See Julia C. Morse & Robert O. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9 REV.
INT’L ORGS. 385, 387–88 (2014). Finally, Snidal, Koremenos, and others show in a
series of arguments that states are deliberate and precise when designing international
agreements, institutions, and organizations precisely because of the power
international organizations hold. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 25–26 (1998);
Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG.
761, 767 (2001).
367. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895, 899–900 (1998) (showing how norms are
internalized through a “life cycle,” diffusing through a system of actors and increasing
their applicability during the process).
368. See Brian Greenhill, The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the
Diffusion of Human Rights Norms, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 127, 129–30 (2010) (suggesting that
international organizations influence states by providing a forum for states to interact
and emulate norms).
369. See Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the
Logic of Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (2006) (proposing that states
channel their policies and norms to other states through international organizations).
370. See Beth Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International
Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 229 (2010) (describing how states utilize institutions,
such as the International Criminal Court, to “pre-commit” themselves to norms).
371. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 7–8 (2009) (examining how treaties are open, public
commitments made by states that signal a state’s obligation to perform certain
behaviors or changes in behaviors).
372. See Thompson, supra note 369, at 14 (examining the actions of the United
States during the Gulf War as a case study to demonstrate how coercive states use
international organizations to influence other states).
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using the Council is to shape the expectations of target states.373 To
hold that Council-imposed obligations are insufficiently infused with
an intention to affect normative change is to ignore the central role
the Council already plays in norm creation and diffusion. Even when
informal groups of states address issues outside the structure of the
Council, they frequently couple their efforts with Council resolutions
for legitimacy,374 and the Council’s legitimacy helps states overcome
collective action problems and rally public support for interventionist
activity.375 In short, international institutions generally—and the
Council specifically—have been shown to assist in the diffusion of
norms among states.
VI.

TWO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

There are at least two potential challenges to our claim that the
Council, acting on behalf of the entire U.N. membership, contributes
evidence of custom. First, Council resolutions do not impose
prospectively binding obligations applicable to all states. Second, the
Council is structurally unsuited to assuming a law-making role. This
Section will examine both objections.
A.

Resolutions are not prospectively binding, as required
by customary international law

The first is that patterns of past Council action are not the same as
obligations that bind parties prospectively. This challenge asserts that
while patterns of obligations may demonstrate the Council’s normative
preferences across more than two decades just passed, they cannot—or
should not—serve as evidence of its preferences for norms in future
conflicts. At a minimum, it could be argued, one would need to assume or
demonstrate that the Council will continue to impose the same obligations
going forward with the same regularity to overcome the criticism.
This claim has two variants. The first is that while the Council may
continue to pass resolutions on most NIACs, it may alter or abandon
its prior normative patterns. The evidence for this is scant. The
373. Id. at 7–9.
374. See Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 59 INT’L
ORG. 559, 575–76 (2005) (describing the activities of the Western Contact Group on
Namibia, which initially operated without a Council mandate but later cooperated with
the Council to legitimize their initiative).
375. See Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Supplying Protection: The United Nations and Public
Support for Humanitarian Intervention, CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 1, 11 (2017)
(finding that, in the context of United States intervention in Syria, Council approval
mitigates some of the problems of collective action and increases public support).
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conflicts in which the Council has imposed obligations differ in time,
location, parties, issues, size, duration, and geo-political context.376
Equally important, the relatively uniform body of obligations was
imposed by a Council whose membership varied regularly over time.377
Given that most conflicts examined continued for multiples years and
even decades, any given conflict was likely addressed by almost seven
different configurations of Council membership.378 That Councilimposed obligations have remained constant while almost every other
aspect of conflicts fluctuates makes it highly unlikely that the Council
would suddenly alter its normative response to NIACS in the future.379
Finally, most of the patterns we identify do not radically alter existing
international law but resolve normative uncertainty or continue
existing trends. This makes sharp Council departures from welltrodden paths less likely.
The second and alternative basis for the claim that patterns of
obligation lack a prospective element is that the Council may address
376. The Council has addressed conflicts in every year, every region, of varying
duration, of varying number of actors, of varying battle deaths and civilian casualties,
at various points in conflict, and both within and outside the sphere of influence of
every hegemonic state. From 1990 to 2013, the conflicts the Council addressed include
those in Sub-Saharan Africa (32%), the Americas (7.5%), the Middle East and North
Africa (28%), Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(13%), Southeast Asia (7.5%), and South Asia (11%). UN Security Council Data Set,
supra note 13. Of the conflicts that meet the criteria for inclusion in our data, fifteen
began after 1990 (of which the Council addressed twelve, or 80%, through
resolutions), and thirty-one began before 1990 (of which the Council addressed
twenty-three, or 74%). Id. The majority of conflicts lasted more than a decade, though
some ended in less than a year. Id. Some involved two main actors, such as Yugoslavia
versus the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo, while others involved numerous
groups with complex alliances and byzantine conflict dynamics. Id.
377. See Current Members, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/
sc/members (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (stating that the Council is comprised of fifteen
member states: five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that are
elected for two-year terms).
378. The average duration of a NIAC is difficult to calculate, in that a large portion
of observations in our data involve ongoing conflicts, and many others are conflicts
that began prior to the start of the data set. Using an open start date and including
only NIACs that have ended, the average duration of a NIAC is approximately twenty
years. Given that the Council’s non-permanent members have two-year terms
staggered in one-year increments, the entire non-permanent membership turns over
every three years. Thus, the average conflict will have been reviewed by six to seven
different Councils, meaning the Council tends to behave consistently, even as the
composition of the body changes substantially.
379. This is not to say the Council would not change its practices to account for
methods that performed well or poorly in the past. Peacekeeping practices, for
example, have evolved substantially since the early 1990s.
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fewer NIACs or become highly selective in those with which it does
engage. Many point to the Council’s absence from the Syrian and
Ukrainian conflicts as evidence that such a retreat is already
underway.380 But neither case has involved abstention based on new
normative preferences for conflict. Council deadlock is instead related
to political disagreements among Council members over the merits of
the conflicts.381 Certainly, there is no evidence that shifting normative
preferences were responsible for the Council’s non-engagement in
Algeria, Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria, the three post-1990
NIACs in our data set on which it passed no resolutions.382
More broadly, some critics may argue that while the Council might
have intended to shape norms in the past, the increasingly jingoistic
tone of international relations signals a retreat from multilateralism.
We do not see this as a debilitating critique. The international system
has both shifts and means. Shifts do occur, during which norms or
systems substantially change. Shifts created the modern system of
international law and repeatedly spread its applications. But means
are also important—and ultimately, the concern is whether the mean
behavior of the Council over the long term creates the reasonable
expectation of the application of international laws to civil conflicts.
This Article claims there is a mean behavior that engenders a mean
expectation, and though aberrations may occur from time to time, they
in themselves only highlight the degree to which expectations have
already converged on acceptable behavior.
B.

The Council is Structurally Unsuited to Law-Making

The second potential challenge asserts that the Council is
structurally ill-suited to produce evidence of international law. This
claim takes a variety of forms: the U.N. Charter does not endow the
Council with law-making powers; the Council is unrepresentative of
the community of states on whose behalf it purports to act; the veto
privileges the P5’s interests above all else; and the Council lacks
attributes of due process and transparency that are essential to any
380. For an assessment of these critiques that does not accept many of their
premises, see Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., The UN Security Council in an Age of Great
Power Rivalry 3 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper Series No. 4, Feb. 2015),
https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1569/WP04_UNSCAgeofPower
Rivalry.pdf (arguing that the inaction in Syria and the Ukraine stemmed from political
deadlock between the five permanent members of the Council).
381. Id. (examining the political alliance between Russia and China in relation to
their joint Council vetoes).
382. See supra notes 323–27; see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.
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legitimate law-making process. The representativeness and veto
concerns were addressed above.383 Nonetheless, these questions
remain. There is certainly no doubt that compared to the full
representation accorded member states or their citizens in bodies,
such as the General Assembly or European Parliament, the clear
codification mandate of the ILC, or the opportunity for full input by
affected parties in judicial bodies, like the ICJ or regional courts, the
Council falls short as a source of normatively relevant practice.
One must question the salience of these all-too accurate
observations after (i) twenty-three years of the Council imposing an
increasingly broad range of obligations on state and non-state actors
alike in NIACs,384 and (ii) the fourteen-year period in which the
Council has been passing, albeit sporadically, explicitly law-making
resolutions.385 More importantly, the legitimacy critiques beg the
question of why attributes of other international bodies should serve as
the measure of the Council’s legitimacy as a participant in law-making.
The aggregation of Council actions over time allows for the
introduction of a unique factor into the legitimacy calculus, namely
the repetition of binding norms across a series of highly diverse
conflicts. This substantial variation in the origin of oft-repeated norms
distinguishes this Article’s view of Council law-making from that
critiqued in most analyses,386 which overwhelmingly focuses on either
explicitly legislative resolutions387—Resolution 1373 (terrorist

383. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing member states’ concerns
about the representativeness of the Council); supra notes 314–15 and accompanying
text (addressing the use of Council vetoes).
384. See supra note 12 (examining Council resolutions on the most consequential
NIACs between 1990 and 2013).
385. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 & n.7 (stating that the Council entered into a
new phase of legislative resolutions with the passage of Resolution 1373 in 2001).
386. An exception is Vincent-Joël Proulx’s analysis of how a broad range of Security
Council resolutions assigning responsibility for various acts contributes to the law of
state responsibility.
See VINCENT-JOËL PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: GLOBAL SECURITY AND UN ORGANS 157–58 (2016).
387. Even with reference to the legislative resolutions, the legitimacy critiques do
not fully match the resolutions’ provenance or actual reception by states. Legislative
resolutions are best described as gap-fillers adding to obligations already contained in
widely ratified treaties and imposing those “treaty-plus” obligations on non-party states.
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financing),388 Resolution 1540 (weapons of mass destruction),389 and
Resolution 2178 (foreign fighters)390—or on single conflict-specific
acts—including creating international criminal tribunals or
demarcating borders.391
The legitimacy critique, moreover, is far from uniform or internally
coherent. Some point to defects in Council process to argue that the
Council has inappropriately expanded its jurisdiction under Article 39
of the Charter to include virtually any issue of general international
concern.392 Others cite the same defects to argue the Council has been

388. Resolution 1373 was based on the obligations in the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which has been ratified by 187
states, though it expanded those obligations in several critical respects. PIERRE KLEIN,
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 4
(2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icsft/icsft_e.pdf.
Compare International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, arts. 4, 6–8, Dec. 9,
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (directing states to pass legislation criminalizing terrorist acts
and taking steps to find terrorists and freeze their assets), with S.C. Res. 1373, at 16,
¶¶ 2–3 (Sept. 28, 2001) (expanding on the Convention by directing states to deny
terrorists safe havens and accelerate the exchange of intelligence to quickly take action
against suspected terrorists).
389. Resolution 1540 on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons was negotiated to
minimize new disarmament obligations on states themselves and placed most emphasis on
preventing non-state actors from acquiring the weapons. S.C. Res. 1540, at 2, ¶¶ 1–2
(Apr. 28, 2004); see BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 17, at 113–14 (arguing that Resolution
1540 enhances existing treaty law by expressly excluding any rights or obligations that
would conflict with current treaties). While some states expressed dissatisfaction with
the breadth of the resolution, negotiations resulted in clarifying its lack of impact on
existing state obligations and a “subsidiary” mechanism that left the details of national
legislation on interdicting weapons up to individual states. See Ian Johnstone, The
Security Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 80, 92–93 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008).
390. S.C. Res. 2178, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2004). Resolution 2178 was cosponsored by 104
states. See U.N. SCOR, 7272nd mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7272 (Sept. 24, 2014). It
repeated many obligations the Council had been imposing on states since the 9/11
attacks. See Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The “Foreign Terrorist
Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part I, EJIL TALK (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terroristfighter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-i.
391. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 (examining Resolution 1373 CounterTerrorism and Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committees); Bjorn Elberling, The Ultra Vires
Character of Legislative Action by the Security Council, 2 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 337, 338–39
(2005) (describing three legislative-type resolutions); Lourdes de la Serna Galván,
supra note 16, at 153–54 (noting the two ad hoc tribunals and demarcation of
Iraq/Kuwait boundary).
392. See generally Joy Gordon, The Sword of Damocles: Revisiting the Question of Whether
the United Nations Security Council Is Bound by International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605,
608–11, 609 n.12 (2012) (referencing sources that critique the Council’s broad authority).
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too timid and selective in the issues and conflicts it addresses.393
Further, the critiques focus only on how the Council’s membership
and procedures delegitimize its actions, omitting discussion of the
positive impact the Council often provides.394 As scholars Roberts and
Zaum observe, “states have invested significant diplomatic capital in
garnering Council authorisation for their actions.”395 When states use
force unilaterally, the first response of many international actors is that
Council approval was absent.396 Monika Hakimi and Jacob Cogan, who
describe a “state code” of norms on the use of force that stands in many
ways in contrast to the formal “institutional code” of the U.N. Charter
and its cognates, find that even the state code accepts the Council’s
primacy on the use of force questions and has done so since the
Council’s reinvigoration after the first Gulf War in 1991.397
The Council was not intended to be a law-making body. Critics of
the Council as law-maker thus invoke aspects of its structure,
membership, and procedures that lack the inclusiveness and due
process guarantees of other law-making processes. But with most
collective efforts at resolving and mitigating the effects of NIACs now
largely centered in the Council, these critiques must be weighed
against the substantial investment that many states—not simply the
P5—have made in Council authority.
CONCLUSION
In light of evidence that the Council has imposed consistent patterns
of obligation on parties to virtually every contemporary NIAC, this
Article has sought to open a dialogue about the relevance of Council
practice to customary international law. The data demonstrate the
Council has taken a side, and arguably contributed to resolving legal
debates, on three important issues: (i) human rights obligations of
non-state actors; (ii) the binding nature of NIAC peace agreements;
and (iii) the necessity of holding elections in post-conflict states. The
data found further that the Council has at least raised the question of
whether a nascent jus ad bellum for NIACs is emerging, based on

393. See ROBERTS & ZAUM, supra note 2, at 68–69 (describing inaction as one of the
Council’s weaknesses).
394. See id. at 71.
395. Id. at 72.
396. See Thompson, supra note 369, at 17–18 (describing the reactions of world
leaders to the United States’ invasion of Iraq at the start of the Gulf War).
397. Monika Hakimi & Jacob Katz Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 257, 261, 268 (2016).
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resolutions that demand an end to hostilities but also delineate several
permissible exceptions.
This Article argues that in imposing these obligations the Council
has acted as an agent for other U.N. member states. In attributing
Council-imposed obligations to the entire U.N. membership, we
extend the Council’s preeminent role in the collective security regime
to the realm of generating practice constitutive of customary
international law. Failure to account for the Council’s centrality in
resolving NIACs—substantially exceeding national interventions in
scope and frequency—would consign this critical international
practice to a legal black hole.
The data set comprises the most complete known account of Council
obligations related to NIACs. The data set opens opportunities for
further research in multiple directions. First, future research can help
understand voting and political dynamics on the Council, such as the
predictors of Council and state support for provisions in resolutions.
Second, combining the data with conflict and civilian casualty data can
help to elucidate the dynamic interactions between the Council and
active conflicts and demonstrate which events or dynamics lead the
Council to use specific provisions. Third, the data allow for analysis of
Council efficacy: how Council provisions affect conflicts and postconflict environments. Students of the Council, human rights,
international humanitarian law, and conflict studies may leverage the
data to tease out the complex linkages between Council politics,
Council decisions, conflicts, and peace.
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APPENDIX I
Security Council Terminology Coding Key
Non-Binding (1)
Acknowledges
Having Considered
Welcomes
Encourages
Appeals to
Notes
Takes note
Invites
Recognizes
Recalls

Possibly Binding (2)
Alarmed that
Deplores
Affirms
Endorses (if not
followed by a
threat)
Underlines
Urges
Commends
Calls Upon
Requests
Stresses
Reaffirms
Supports
Emphasizes
Reminds
Invites
Reiterates
Expresses deep/
grave concern

Clearly Binding (3)
Decides
Authorizes
Demands
Determines
Resolves
Condemns
Endorses (if followed
by a threat)

